University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses

Student Research

2016

The moral price of the profit motive in medicine
John Sobieski

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses
Part of the Leadership Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Sobieski, John, "The moral price of the profit motive in medicine" (2016). Honors Theses. Paper 952.

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

The Moral Price of the Profit Motive in Medicine
by
John Sobieski

Honors Thesis
in
Jepson School of Leadership Studies
University of Richmond
Richmond, VA
April 25, 2014
Advisor: Dr. Jessica Flanigan

1

Abstract

The Moral Price of the Profit Motive in Medicine
John Sobieski

Committee members: Dr. Jessica Flanigan, Dr. Terry Price, Dr. Javier Hidalgo

My thesis argues that a medical profit motive is immoral because medical care influenced by a
profit motive can undermine the value of patient health. In Chapter I, I develop a moral critique
of the medical profit motive while arguing that doctors have a moral obligation to promote
patient health and well-being. Additionally, I demonstrate that a medical profit motive can
theoretically exist in medical decision-making and be permissible. In Chapter II, I explore the
medical profit motive on the organizational level. I argue that the structure of modern medical
care allows for a profit motive to regularly be introduced into medical decision-making. I also
demonstrate that an organizational medical profit motive is more morally impermissible at the
administrative level. I will offer suggestions on how to better align modern medical care with
moral medical care—both on an individual level and a structural level; in addition, I then offer
suggestions on how health care systems and medical groups can change current practices to
either diffuse a medical profit motive or align pecuniary profit motives with proper medical care.
In Chapter III, I focus on the application of my argument into health care policy, and from this
application, I forward a theory of values-centered health care.
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Introduction
The profit motive in medicine, which is the desire to maximize pecuniary profit as a
primary motivation in patient care, is unethical. Regardless of whether the functional body
outputting a medical profit motive is a physician, a group of physicians, or a large hospital,
proper medical care should not be undermined by a desire for monetary gain. To say that medical
care should not concern itself with money (i.e. costs, budgets) would be foolish; rather, I am
asserting that treating medicine like any other business is disrespectful to the core values that
predicate patient care. Human health is too important of a currency to be thrust into a system of
financial modeling and cost/benefit analyses that aim to yield maximal gains; medical
practitioners should be primarily motivated by maximizing patient health and wellness.
My thesis argues that a medical profit motive is immoral because medical care influenced
by a profit motive can undermine the value of patient health. In Chapter I, I develop a moral
critique of the medical profit motive while arguing that doctors have a moral obligation to
promote patient health and well-being. Additionally, I demonstrate that a medical profit motive
can theoretically exist in medical decision-making and be permissible. In Chapter II, I explore
the medical profit motive on the organizational level. I argue that the structure of modern
medical care allows for a profit motive to regularly be introduced into medical decision-making.
I also demonstrate that an organizational medical profit motive is more morally impermissible at
the administrative level. I will offer suggestions on how to better align modern medical care with
moral medical care—both on an individual level and a structural level; in addition, I then offer
suggestions on how health care systems and medical groups can change current practices to
either diffuse a medical profit motive or align pecuniary profit motives with proper medical care.
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In Chapter III, I focus on the application of my argument into health care policy, and from this
application, I forward a theory of values-centered health care.
Chapter I: The Problem with the Medical Profit Motive
“Either perspective is by itself stubbornly one-sided in its view of physicians simply as selfinterested economic accumulators or as devoted altruists. We favor a view which recognizes that
these two perspectives are not incompatible and accepts the elements of truth in each of them.” 1

The medical profit motive allows medical practitioners to privilege monetary profit over
human health and well-being. For this reason, the profit motive is immoral. My goal in this
chapter is to propose guidelines for how physicians can permissibly act on profit motivation in
clinical practice. Patients have certain justifiable expectations from their physicians, and those
expectations are part of what generates a physician’s obligations to their patient. Even absent
from expectations, there are ways that a doctor ought to treat their patient populations based on
the role they assume (a medical doctor), the value that is at stake in operating through their role
(human health), and the uniqueness of the physician-patient relationship (or, at least, what is at
stake within the relationship). Given that a physician truly has strong moral reasons—or an
obligation—to promote patient health and wellness, it is morally impermissible to bypass those
obligations through an ulterior motive. This is especially the case when the currency at stake—
the currency that could potentially be lost in a coercive transaction—is of value so supreme, that
it is morally abhorrent to disrespect.
The argument is as follows:
P1: Doctors have a moral obligation to promote patient health and well-being.
1

Brock, Dan W., and Allen E. Buchanan. "The Profit Motive in Medicine." The Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy 12 (February 1987): 1-35. doi:10.1093/jmp/12.1.1.
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P2: In some instances, a medical profit motive acts antagonistically against the moral
obligations obtained by physicians.
C1: Pro tanto, a medical profit motive is immoral.
P3: Outcomes can outweigh morally impermissible motives.
P4: When a medical profit motive is pursued to promote patient health and well-being in
the most optimal manner, the outcomes of the medical profit motive align with the
outcomes of moral medical care.
C2: Beneficial health outcomes can outweigh an immoral profit motive, though the profit
motive remains impermissible.

In Section I, I demonstrate why doctors have obligations to their patients, and why these
obligations amount to a medical doctor being required to promote patient health. Doctors have
general duties to several different parties that they encounter as well as obligations generated
through the physician-patient relationship. I will explore how these obligations are generated and
what importance they have relative to other obligations. Even if one does not subscribe to the
existence of special obligations in medical care, physicians still have strong moral reasons to
promote patient health and well-being. In Section II consider a particular reason that strong
obligations are generated in medical decision-making: the unconditional value of health. In
Section III, I then show that the obligations that physicians have to their patients are sometimes
violated when physicians consider profit obtainment during medical decision-making. Through
the discussion in Section II and III, I argue that human health has unconditional value whereas
monetary profit is only conditionally valuable. For this reason, a medical profit motive is pro
tanto immoral to uphold in medical decision-making. A medical profit motive can exist when the
motive is utilized to promote patient health in the most optimal way possible, but the moral
obligations of physicians must be considered over medical profit motives when the two conflict.
In Section IV, I apply these principles into the doctor-patient relationship as it exists in the
current medical environment. In Section V, I discuss the implications of this position and
consider relevant objections to my argument.
7

I.

Obligations in Medical Practice
When a parent takes care of her child, there are obligations that the parent has to her

child. When someone signs a contract with you, that individual has an obligation to you to
uphold the terms of that contract. The existence of obligations is relatively uncontroversial; what
is more debatable is the basis of obligations, the kinds of obligations that can exist, and the
extent to which particular obligations matter over other obligations or other considerations. For
example, one might believe that a parent’s obligation to take care of their child would be
stronger than an obligation to pick up a friend from the airport. That plausible position must be
defended by claiming that the value of the parent-child relationship—or what is at stake when
violating that relationship—is more valuable than what is at stake in a particular friendship.
Through an analogous weighing of values, I will argue that medical doctors have an especially
strong moral obligation to their patients, and this obligation is to promote patient health. My
argument does not hinge on the existence of special obligations. Even if one were to claim that
unique obligations did not exist in medical care, I will still be able to demonstrate that doctors
have strong moral reasons to promote patient health and well-being before considering any nonmedical factors in medical decision-making.
To illustrate the basis of obligations, consider the following case:
The Basketball Game. 100 individuals are present at a basketball game and are currently
occupying the bleachers. Suddenly, one person (C) collapses in the stands and is showing the
signs of having a heart attack. Assume that only one individual may assist C before the
paramedics arrive. You are also one of the individuals in the stands.
This case illustrates that we all have moral obligations to assist people in need. If it were
true that obligations did not exist between human beings, there would be no binding reason that
any of the 99 other individuals would have to make an attempt to save C’s life. If no obligations
8

to assist existed, no one would be morally blameworthy for C’s negative medical outcome (or
failing to aid C). Without duties to assist, someone could still make an attempt to save C’s life
because it would align with their desires/ends or would be—for some reason—desirable to them.
But people should not just save C’s life because of their desires, but rather because a general
duty of beneficence exists in society. Under a general duty of beneficence, which stems from
multiple prominent moral theories, there are strong moral reasons to assist those in need when
assisting is possible. 2 If we acknowledge a general duty of beneficence exists, then the obligation
to attempt to save C’s life stems from the fact that C is another person in need (so C should be
saved if it is possible and reasonable).
Given that C should be saved, who should save C? One plausible way of allocating the
obligation to save C is proximity. Imagine you are one of the individuals in the stands, so perhaps
you should make an attempt to save C. Unfortunately, you are on the absolute far left side of the
bleachers, and C collapsed on the absolute far right side of the bleachers. The person directly
next to C is G, and G happens to have the same medical knowledge as you. Moreover, C requires
immediate medical attention, and by the time you are able to reach C, his condition will
significantly worsen. If this were the case, G has a greater duty to save C’s life, especially if C
has a time-sensitive ailment. From this, we can see that there is sometimes a spatial component
to obligations. Still, this obligation is not supreme to all other considerations that G may hold; it
was simple chance that G was placed next to C. If G had some “special” or unique obligation to
C, G would also have a “special” obligation to every adjacent individual in the bleachers if they

2

Beauchamp, Tom, "The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/principle-beneficence/>.
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happened to show signs of having a heart attack and nothing would oblige G to treat C before
any adjacent person.
Or, imagine that C happened to attend the basketball game with a spouse, S. We might
also think that S has a stronger obligation to save C’s life over saving your life or G’s life
because S has an established relationship with C. If this is true, S would have an obligation to
save C’s life before saving your life or G’s life, even if you or G happened to collapse in a
similar moment with a similar medical ailment. How can we explain that belief? S has a special
relationship with C, and S is uniquely positioned to recognize the needs of C. S has a legitimate
reason to favor the medical needs of C over adjacent persons when another individual may give
medical attention to C.
Or, imagine that G made a promise to act in the best medical interest of C, or let us even
say that G signed some sort of contract with C in similar terms. This seems to be the most
compelling case yet for which an individual has a particularly strong obligation to promote the
health of C. If there was a promise or contract involved, G would be especially at fault for not
attending to the medical needs of C compared to other bystanders.
Before G rushes to action, consider another case:
The Basketball Game, Part II. 100 individuals are present at a basketball game and are
currently occupying the bleachers. Suddenly, one person (C) collapses in the stands and
is showing the signs of having a heart attack. Assume that only one individual may assist
C before the paramedics arrive. You are one of the individuals in the bleachers. The
individuals in the bleachers include G (who has signed a contract with C to act in C’s best
medical interest) and D, who is a medical doctor.

Regardless of where D is seated, whether D was familiar with C before this occurrence, or if G
signed some sort of contract with C with the terms mentioned above, D is the best positioned to
10

promote the medical needs of C. Therefore, D should be the individual to assist C. In general
terms, D has an obligation—as a medical doctor—to promote the medical needs of any
individual in close proximity and in an emergency situation.
Interestingly, a doctor’s obligations trump the general duties of beneficence that any
other individual may have towards C (I will further argue for this position later on). It does not
necessarily change the obligations that other individuals have towards C; it instead allows the
obligations that other individuals have towards C—the obligations to promote C’s health (or
life)—to be an obligation to allow D to perform some action of medical assistance. In cases of
human health, the role that a doctor assumes comes along with powerful obligations, obligations
that may even outweigh the obligations of other agents. These obligations apply equally to
anyone at the basketball game, and they could still hypothetically be subdued by a further, more
powerful obligation: a doctor’s unique obligation to one of their patients.
Thus, consider a third—and final—case:
The Basketball Game, Part III. 100 individuals are present at a basketball game and are
currently occupying the bleachers. Suddenly, one person (C) collapses in the stands and is
showing the signs of having a heart attack. Assume that only one individual may assist C before
the paramedics arrive. You are one of the individuals in the bleachers. The individuals in the
bleachers include D, who is a medical doctor. C also happens to be a patient of D.

Since C is D’s patient, D is indisputably the one who must act on C’s behalf. The doctorpatient relationship generates obligations that the physician has towards the affected individual,
C. Not only do doctors have obligations towards members of society from duties of
beneficence—similar to other citizens—and obligations to care based on their role as a medical
doctor, they also have special relationships with their patients, which generate strong obligations.
These successively developing cases demonstrate that strong obligations relating to human
11

health exist in society, and further, these cases demonstrate that a medical doctor reliably incurs
these strong obligations in the same way that a spouse incurs obligations (or how proximity can
generate obligations).
These basketball cases may not have demonstrated the strength of a physician’s
obligations conclusively, but there are several other reasons to believe that the doctor-patient
relationship can generate obligations that carry great moral weight. Before I turn to the exact
nature of these obligations—what a medical doctor is obligated to do—I want to explain why
medical doctors possess strong obligations to their patients. Below, I will list and describe five
ways that an individual can gain obligations, and from the list, I will explain how each situation
applies to a medical doctor in the doctor-patient relationship. (Note: this list is not exhaustive,
but it is certainly a list of several conspicuous reasons.)
First, strong obligations can be generated when someone assumes a distinct role; we shall
call these obligations role obligations. 3 Individuals in certain roles have obligations to persons,
groups of persons, or even society. When someone assumes a role—willingly or unwillingly—he
accepts that obligations come packaged with the role. At least when roles are assumed willingly,
so too are obligations. Even if one believes that obligations are only generated when an
individual assumes them voluntarily, some roles and their attending obligations are voluntary.
For example, if someone chooses to become a firefighter, he has assumed the role of
“firefighter”. Normally, we do not have an obligation to run into a burning building and save
people and possessions, but we do have a duty to save someone’s life (if possible). But, we could
not reasonably be expected to run into a burning building without training or equipment. Luckily,
3

Jeske, Diane. "Special Obligations." Stanford University. October 17, 2002. Accessed March 27, 2014.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/#4.
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the person who has assumed the role of firefighter is required to uphold his obligation to fight
fires, and in doing so, he is upholding the general duties of beneficence for the rest of society (a
sort of division of moral labor). 4
The division of labor for society’s general duties is morally relevant, and this idea also
demonstrates the true importance of a division of moral labor in other situations. When someone
willingly assumes a role that generates unique or necessary obligations, she is accountable for
upholding those obligations. If someone chooses to become a teacher, she must be in the
business of promoting the rational capacities of the people she is instructing; that is one of the
obligations that teachers must have. The obligations stemming from being a teacher are directly
linked to the act carried out from her role as teacher. If a teacher does not uphold the obligation
to educate, it cannot be said that she is a morally sound teacher.
The role of a doctor also generates strong obligations—obligations that are directly linked
to the doctoral identity. When someone becomes a doctor, he obtains special responsibilities and
obligations that normal citizens would not have based on their medical training, access to
relevant information and technology, and the other features of a career in medicine. Doctors
willingly assume that role, and in doing so, consent to upholding certain principles of proper
patient care. It is clear that doctors consent to their role and the obligations that go with it
because they pledge to act in their patient’s best medical interest. 5 Whenever people voluntarily
enter into the role of medical doctor, they are fully aware that being a doctor means having
special responsibilities within patient care.
4

For more on the concept of “Division of Moral Labour”, please see: Scheffler, Samuel, and Véronique
Munoz-Dardé. "The Division of Moral Labour."Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
Volumes 79 (2005): 229-53. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106941.
5
Orr, R. D., N. Pang, E. D. Pellegrino, and M. Siegler. "Use of the Hippocratic Oath: A Review of
Twentieth Century Practice and a Content Analysis of Oaths Administered in Medical Schools in the U.S.
and Canada in 1993." Journal of Clinical Ethics 8.4 (1997): 377-88. Print.
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Similar to the fireman scenario, the role obligations of medical doctors are important
because they uphold society’s intrinsic duty to promote health and livelihood, the most concrete
and essential realization of a duty of beneficence. Just like you or I would not be expected to run
into the burning building, we cannot be expected to pick up a scalpel and perform surgery. Does
that mean we are not obligated to promote health? No, but non-physicians certainly do not have a
strong obligation to promote health based solely from our role in society. 6
Second, role obligations are particularly strong when they are premised on providing
public goods, as opposed to a role that is premised on providing instrumental goods, private
goods, or conditional goods. A firefighter has strong obligations to fight fires, but one can also
imagine that, for example, a landscaping company has a unique obligation to maintain your
external property if you are a customer of their company. Apart from considerations of the
impact from not upholding these sets of obligations, maintaining the aesthetics of a property is
not a public good—it is an instrumental good. By “public good”, I mean a good that is shared by
the largest set possible of individuals in a community with the largest net benefit to the
community. 7 Public goods are provided by a subset of individuals within a community, and I
further define a public good as some good that is owed to a community based on the intrinsic
rights of the people within that community. Within this definition of a public good, landscaping
services are not a public good. Certainly, it is good that the company upholds their obligations to
you, but that is merely contractual. One may claim that a landscaping company has an obligation
not to destroy your property or harm any person on your property, but individuals are already
6

Other patient care professionals may have a similar strong obligation, but I am not concerned with that
idea in this thesis. Here, I am looking at the moral significance of profit motivation forwarded by doctors
in the doctor-patient relationship. Future work may explore profit motivation on a variety of levels in
patient care, but this argument will not.
7
Shue, Henry. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
UP, 1980. Print.
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owed this level of respect, protection, and consideration from every individual member of
society. Within the realm of public good-promoting obligations, one can imagine that even this
set of obligations can be graded based on importance—and thus some can be morally worse for
failing to uphold. As mentioned above, everyone cannot be expected to fight fires (even if
everyone ought to promote safety and well-being in society through a duty of beneficence), so
providing for this public good is a necessary condition of being in a civilized society.
Given this distinction, doctors are more like firefighters than landscapers because they
provide for public goods rather than instrumental goods or private goods. Medical doctors are
responsible for promoting the health of the human population, which is a necessary precondition
to satisfy almost any other public good. 8 To further illustrate the distinction between public
goods and instrumental goods, examine the following case:
The King’s Dilemma. King Arthur has a finite amount of gold pieces that he must spend
on his castle, and his advisors assure him that the gold can only be spent in one of two
ways. One way that King Arthur can spend his gold is to build a state-of-the-art
educational institution that will develop the rational capacities of his citizens. On the
other hand, King Arthur can also choose to spend the gold on a combination of sanitation,
hygienic, and medicinal purposes. The kingdom can noticeably benefit from additional
education. In addition, severe health issues already exist within the castle walls, but can
be cured through the implementation of purposes listed above.
This thought experiment is introduced to show that some public goods are more morally urgent
than others, and therefore they should have priority over other goods when considering how to
allocate resources in order to promote such goods. Knowledge development is a non-excludable
public good that everyone benefits from, and for that fact, we have reasons to uphold or promote

8

Shue, Henry. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
UP, 1980. Print.
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that good in society. 9 What is proper education without adequate human health among an
educated population? Citizens can still be educated, but if a population is not healthy and is
lacking a particular quality to life, it is hard to justify spending a majority of resources on
developing rational capacities when a majority of resources can be allocated to combat active
health threats to the population. This is not to suggest that promoting rational capacity should be
forfeited in health crises, but in essence, promoting health and well-being is instrumental to—or
a necessary condition of—promoting any other public good, including education.
Even if one does not believe that human health and well-being is a public good that
everyone is obligated to promote, they can at least see how health can be instrumental to
maintaining other public goods. Klosko introduced a theory of political obligation towards lesser
discretionary goods that stems from a society benefitting from presumably beneficial public
goods. In his argument, if a scheme of government X provides a non-excludable public good A
(along with a set of other goods that may not be presumably beneficial in the same way), as long
as the cost to maintain A with discretionary goods does not come at the same cost as failing to be
provided A, one can have an obligation to promote those discretionary goods. 10 In this way, if
we have obligations to promote non-excludable public goods that we benefit from, we may have
obligations to promote public goods that are preconditions of those certain non-excludable public
goods being maintained or promoted. I assert that health and well-being count as public goods
that are necessary to promote in order to preserve other non-excludable public goods in our
society.

9

Klosko, George. "Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation." Philosophy and Public
Affairs 16.3 (1987): 241-59. Print.
10
Ibid., 241-59.
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However, as it has been demonstrated already, we cannot all be expected to directly
promote human health (even though we all have that obligation in some form or another).
Consider this: just like we have obligations not to interfere with national defense, we do not
necessarily have to actively promote or maintain national defense—even if we benefit from it.
This might not change our obligations to promoting or maintaining the public good of national
defense, but regardless, I believe that it is still obligation-inducing. To examine this in a different
light, we have obligations of not interfering with non-excludable public goods that juxtaposes
with our obligation to promote non-excludable public goods. We may not have obligations to
directly promote national defense (but we have obligations to refrain from internally threatening
public safety), so too citizens may not have obligations to promote health directly while still
having obligations not to degrade health (I will soon argue for this in more detail).
Fortunately, some individuals can directly fulfill their societal obligations to promote
public goods. Just as the soldiers in our military actively incur the public good-promoting role
obligation related to national defense, so too, doctors are the guardians against the threats
towards society’s health and well-being. If it is not the most important public good to promote,
the right to be healthy—to a reasonable degree—is one of the most important public goods to
promote. Since doctors, from their role, are charged with this task, they are given strong
obligations to promote well-being in their communities. This set of obligations is not necessarily
stronger when the individual being treated is the patient of the doctor, but the public goodpromoting obligations are definitely more salient.
Third, as the basketball case illustrated, strong obligations may be generated when we are
well positioned to provide some form of a good. Physicians therefore have especially strong
obligations to promote health because they are well placed to do so. Peter Singer’s classic
17

example of a baby drowning in a pond illustrates this intuition. If a baby is drowning and you are
standing right next to the pond where it is drowning in, your obligation to help the child is
especially strong because you are well positioned to provide a good that is essential to the child’s
existence. 11 I simultaneously agree and disagree with the position that Singer has presented. I
think that distance (from the pond, from a patient, etc.) must be normatively relevant; the fact
that you are standing beside the pond does not change your general obligation to save the child’s
life, it just makes that obligation more prominent. In other words, the fact that you happen to be
standing next to the pond does not spontaneously create a new obligation to save the child’s life
when it comes as a minimal cost or risk to you. Nevertheless, you may be less blameworthy for
allowing a similar child located 300 miles away to drown in a similar pond. Proximity does not
change one’s obligations, but it does alert us to those obligations. Singer would contend with this
belief, but where I agree with Singer is the idea of someone being well-positioned to provide a
certain good or beneficial action. Being well-positioned can be translated through different
media. In Singer’s case, being well-positioned can mean having the ability (assuming little risk is
undertaken by the acting agent) to aid the drowning child, which is a more literal interpretation
of “well-positioned”. Well-positioned can also be interpreted to mean having a knowledge base
or a skill set that can allow one to aid—with minimal risk obtainment—someone in need.
In this way, like the bystander near a drowning child, physicians are well-positioned to
provide a good that is essential to human existence. Having a library of medical knowledge and
knowing how to treat an array of human ailments, the medical doctor possesses a number of
obligations towards human health promotion that other individuals without that knowledge
cannot be at fault for not upholding. As in the basketball case (II), the fact that D, the doctor, had
11

Singer, Peter. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." Philosophy and Public Affairs 1.3 (1972): 229-43.
Print.
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the knowledge and skill necessary to properly treat C was the true reason that D was morally
required to treat C, not just because D was the “doctor” present. Having the proper medical
knowledge and skill set to treat medical ailments is an intrinsic component of being a doctor, but
we can also separate it to show that even without the title, the same set of abilities generates a set
of strong obligations. For example, consider a scenario where D is an individual who is present
and is not a medical doctor. While he is not in this role, he has studied heart attacks for years and
happens to have the proper knowledge and skills necessary to effectively treat C. By having that
knowledge—without being a physician—D still has an obligation to treat C. Taking this further,
when a person with an exceptional knowledge of proper human health is engaged in a
relationship with someone who is seeking counsel on proper human health, it would be morally
reprehensible for the expert to not utilize, to their fullest capacity, their medical knowledge or
skill; increased responsibility—and therefore moral accountability—can be assigned when an
agent with medical expertise is willingly engaging with an agent who is forfeiting a portion of
their agency (in medical decision-making) to the individual with medical expertise.
Fourth, obligations can be generated when individuals willingly enter into an obligationgenerating relationship, which would bestow particular voluntary obligations upon the respective
agents in the relationship. As mentioned before, it is easy to see how one can incur strong
obligations when he knowingly consents to having them; assuming that an agent is fully
informed about what obligations will come along with entering into an obligation-generating
relationship (and he agrees to enter into the relationship), he is culpable if he does not uphold
those obligations. Thus, this form of obligation generation is important because it is widely
agreed as being true, even by the non-voluntarist school of thought on obligations.
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A classic example of this type of obligation generation is when an individual signs a
contract to uphold certain obligations to another individual (or a group of individuals). For
example, if I sign up for a cellular phone service, I agree to pay a cellular phone company every
month to provide me various instrumental goods related to having a cellular phone; this
agreement is in the form of a contract that I sign. If I no longer wish to have an obligation to pay
the cellular phone company, I can opt out of the contract (and forfeit my ability to receive
services from that particular company), but while I am bound by the contract, I must uphold my
obligation to pay the company. Assuming that I have read the terms of the contract and
understand their implications, there is no reason that I should be surprised that I have an
obligation to uphold the contractual terms. 12
Employment relationships are another example of how voluntary agreements can
generate obligations. When one agrees to be an employee in an organization or for another
person, there are unique obligations that the employee has towards their employer. Similar to the
contractual argument, if the employee is not coerced into an employment relationship (it is truly
voluntary), then the employee has obligations to her employers. This principle applies as long as
the agreement and nature of work are morally permissible (i.e. an employee is not coerced into
employment and voluntarily accepts employment terms that they are aware of, or a hit man
would not be morally obligated to murder just because the hit man was under a contract). 13
Like customers or employees, doctors are fully aware what obligations come along with
agreeing to be a medical doctor, and therefore they implicitly consent to these obligations
(otherwise, they should not participate in patient care). Consent-based obligations are strong,
12
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voluntary obligations when the values and obligations at stake within the voluntary relationship
are clear and well-known upon engaging in such a relationship. 14 When someone is graduating
medical school, he has an understanding of the ethical implications of being a medical doctor. To
affirm this belief, graduating medical students often take some sort of oath (whether it be the
Hippocratic Oath or the Oath of Maimonides) to not harm patients and to operate in the patient’s
best medical interest. 15
One may object that consent-based obligations are established through knowledge of the
profession, knowledge of the values at stake in medical care, and knowledge that primary
motivator for medical decision-making ought to be patient health and well-being. Yet there is
strong evidence that any reasonable knowledge conditions are met because new medical doctors
experience a period of residency after their academic medical education, a period of observation
and understanding of the true medical profession that compliments years of clinical observation,
medical ethics education, and interactions with other physicians. Therefore, a medical doctor is
fully aware of what obligations he will be incurring in a medical career and the value of patient
health that is at stake in medical decision-making. From this, it would be unreasonable for a
physician to claim that he did not voluntarily consent to promoting patient health and well-being.
That is like saying a police officer does not consent to upholding the law when she becomes a
police officer. The voluntary obligations of physicians are fundamental to their profession, and if
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a physician acts outside of obligations he knowingly consented to, he is not acting as a morally
sound doctor ought to act.
Fifth, a fiduciary relationship can generate obligations. 16 A fiduciary relationship is one
that is established based on a differential of influence and agency capacities; in the relationship,
one agent has weak agency, or when “an agent who is either ignorant of the consequences of his
actions or is not directly involved in the transaction [and] relies on another person to transact on
his behalf (for example, children in child labour agreements, citizens in agreements between
countries).” 17 In a relationship based upon dispensation of decision-making action to an agent in
a better position to make decisions, the agent on the top of the power differential is called the
“fiduciary”. A classic example of a fiduciary relationship is when someone hires a stockbroker to
invest a set amount of money. When you give a stockbroker your confidence (in the form of a
large sum of money), you are forfeiting your ability to have complete control over your assets in
the hope that your stockbroker will make decisions with the given amount of assets in your best
financial interest. In this relationship, the stockbroker possesses not only a significant portion of
your property, but also a great deal of trust from you, his client. This concession of trust
generates strong obligations on the fiduciary’s behalf. 18 If I believed that my stockbroker would
be self-interested during a time period when they made investments with my money, I would not
give them my money in the first place. Placing the needs of the non-fiduciary agent first and
foremost in a fiduciary relationship is a necessary requirement for that relationship to justly
remain intact. If the fiduciary does not place the needs and concerns of the affected agent before
16
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his own needs, substitutes the needs of the affected agent for less important or beneficial needs,
or just disregards those needs, the fiduciary is taking advantage of the special relationship—and
thus the fiduciary loses credibility (and should lose influence).
The doctor-patient relationship is also a fiduciary relationship, which is yet another
reason that doctors have strong obligations to act in the best medical interest of their patients.
When it comes to medical decision-making, individuals are naturally weak agents. A vast
majority of individuals do not have the medical knowledge or expertise to make informed
decisions about their health care. 19 When someone seeks counsel from a medical doctor, they are
doing so under a set of implicit assumptions about the doctor’s intentions. Operating under
implicit assumptions in a fiduciary relationship comes along with obligations to act in
accordance with those assumptions, so long as those assumptions are reasonable, moderately
uniform across similar relationships, and the fiduciary is aware—going into the fiduciary role
assumption—of the responsibilities they possess that generate these assumptions.
For example, if I visit my doctor with knee pain under the assumption that he will avoid
touching my knee during his clinical assessment, I cannot reasonably expect this. Therefore, my
physician would not be at fault for conducting a physical examination of my knee. In contrast, if
I visit my doctor with knee pain and expect the physician to treat my (potential) injury in my best
medical interest, this is a very reasonable expectation. Another reason to believe that fiduciary
duties are formed within the doctor-patient relationship is because a patient consents to medical
19
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care from the doctor, thereby forfeiting a significant portion of their agency in the medical
decision-making process. However, when consenting to medical care and forfeiting this agency,
it is vital that individuals consent to this process willingly. Assuming this occurs, individuals can
reasonably expect a medical doctor to be making medical decisions with their best medical
interest in mind, just like a client can expect a lawyer to be making legal decisions for them in
the best interest of the client. If a physician does not act out of those intentions, he is acting
coercively. If a patient forfeits agency in the medical decision-making process and is naturally a
weak agent in the field of medical decision-making, it can be said that a medical doctor—
responsible for their care—gains fiduciary duties.
The foregoing arguments all support the claim that physicians can have obligations to
their patients. Role obligations, public good-promoting role obligations, favorable positions,
voluntary obligations, and fiduciary relationships relating to medical care all generate
obligations, and medical doctors have obligations to patients for these five reasons. I now turn to
the question of why health promotion is so important. Why are the obligations of physicians
premised on human health promotion before all other considerations? To answer this question,
and to explain how this answer is foundational to our understanding of proper medical care, I
will now address the value of human health, a value that is so resilient, it has been able to bolster
my arguments for doctoral obligations—and even prima facie generate obligations for
physicians.
II.

The Unconditional Value of Health: Characterization and Obligation Generation
To say something is unconditionally valuable means that it is valuable regardless of

whether or not an agent subjectively values that item. For example, regardless of whether

24

someone values my autonomy, it can be said that my autonomy is valuable—irrespective of what
moral theory informs that value assignment. The mere fact that my autonomy exists makes it
valuable, and without my autonomy, I am not able to access and pursue personal projects. 20 The
counter to something being unconditionally valuable is for that something to be instrumentally
valuable; when an item is instrumentally valuable, the value of that item depends on the
individual assessing the value of that item. Even if the individual may place a high value on an
instrumentally valuable item, it does not mean that it must be uniformly respected and not
interfered with (and vice versa). For example, if you happen to value a slice of pizza, it is
valuable to you, but a slice of pizza is still just instrumentally valuable. There is nothing
unconditionally valuable about pizza, and it is completely reasonable for someone to not value
pizza.
This distinction is morally significant because it illustrates the reasons in favor of
respecting certain things. If I do not value a slice of pizza, I cannot prevent you from eating
pizza, but not because of the value of pizza. Rather, in doing so, I would not be valuing (read:
would be disrespecting) your unconditionally valuable autonomy, and as long as you eating pizza
does not interfere with the unconditional values of others, you are free to respect that
instrumental value. Still, we needn’t respect all autonomous choices. Imagine you want to
murder a pizza vendor in order to gain a free slice of pizza. This is not permissible; you may
value pizza and see a net positive in personal value from having the slice of pizza, but this cannot
be valued the same as ending the pizza vendor’s life—it can’t be equated, and therefore can’t be
considered a moral decision. This case illustrates that values must be balanced, and that
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unconditionally valuable things like autonomy should generally outweigh instrumentally
valuable things.
Now, suppose that you happened to be starving so badly that you were on the brink of
death and the only food that you had access to—before your impending death—was a slice of
pizza. Even if you did not subjectively value that slice of pizza, the slice would become more
valuable within the moment that it had the immediate potential to save your life. Lifesaving pizza
is still instrumentally valuable, but it becomes instrumental to promoting a higher order value
(something unconditionally valuable): your health and well-being. Your situation changed the
value of the aforementioned pizza because the slice of pizza is necessary to preserve other values
within your life (and the essence of your life); something instrumentally valuable like a slice of
pizza is able to become at least more objectively valuable because it is promoting value of a
higher order.
It may be ironic that I am discussing pizza in a section about human health and life, but
these cases illustrate how values like autonomy or human health should not be weighed against
other conditionally valuable things. As a baseline argument from the lifesaving slice of pizza
example, if one maintains that health is an instrumental value, there are still reasons to think that
health promotion can still matter. Beyond that, I believe that health promotion is instrumentally
valuable to promoting the unconditional value of health.
My claim is that health is unconditionally valuable. This idea is informed by a Kantian
moral theory: human health is unconditionally valuable because it is a necessary condition for
one’s rational will to exist (and to be properly maintained and fostered, for that matter). Without
proper health, one cannot fully pursue personal projects—and cannot fully exercise their rational
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capacities. For that reason, human health is a value that exists within each human being, and that
value exists regardless of the individual perspective on that value. David Velleman, in his paper
entitled A Right of Self-Termination? explores this idea. Velleman supports the notion that
human health—in the form of human life—is valuable regardless of subjective opinion. He
rejects the idea that human life can never be ended, but he supports the idea that human life
cannot be ended based upon one’s own valuation of a life (or, in other words, a substitution of an
instrumental value for an unconditional value). Velleman introduces that idea here:
“That’s what I miss in so many discussions of euthanasia and assisted suicide: a sense of
something in each of us that is larger than any of us, something that makes human life
more than just an exchange of costs for beneﬁts, more than just a job or a trip to the mall.
I miss the sense of a value in us that makes a claim on us—a value that we must live up
to.” 21
Velleman is speaking about the inherent value within us that exists objective to our individuality,
something that not only we must “live up to,” but—as he further explores—that we must respect.
When I say respect, I mean not only in the sense of non-interference (our negative duties in
regards to the value in others), but also in the sense of aid and value promotion (our positive
duties in regards to the value in others).
This value that we must respect is our rational will and livelihood. When we are in a state
where our rational will and livelihood are above a reasonable, baseline level that does not hinder
our essential activities or projects, it may be said that we are healthy. 22 Surely, one may have a
definition of healthy that includes the necessity of proper diet, consistent exercise, and maybe
even a certain degree of mental stimulation, but the exact definition of human health is not what I
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am trying to clarify in this argument. However minimally a definition of human health may be
structured, my only claim about health is that it is better to be healthy.
Some parameters of human health are uncontroversial. For instance, simply maintaining
basic organ functioning does not mean you are healthy; I would not consider someone in a
persistent vegetative state to be healthy. On the opposite side of the spectrum, I do not think it is
fair to include something like a particular amount of muscle mass or a cosmetic feature to be
included in a definition of health. For the sake of the argumentation, the definition of health that
I will be using is as follows: If someone is free of disease and illness, is not living a life that will
inevitably lead to preventable disease or illness, and can carry out normal species functioning on
a day-to-day basis without aid, I will consider that individual “healthy”. 23 Thus, when I am
speaking about health promotion, I am referring to aiding a return to the conditions mentioned
above (or, in cases where that may not be possible, the best effort possible in order to attempt to
return an individual to the conditions mentioned above).
With that established, I want to reintroduce the point made prior to the preceding
paragraph. As Velleman has explored in his argument on self-termination (and something
explored by many philosophers writing on Kantian ethics), we have value intrinsic to our
humanity that cannot be interfered with for something of lesser value (i.e. happiness, money) to
be promoted. Further, we have a duty—as fellow human beings—to respect the rational will and
existence of other human beings, with the idea of “respect” being actualized in two forms.
Taking that idea to the arena of human health and well-being, according to a deontological
affirmation that we must respect—in more than one way—the rational will and livelihood of
23
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others, from the previous argument, it then follows that we have an obligation to “respect”
human health and well-being.
This fact is much easier to comprehend from the perspective of negative duties; surely, I
have an obligation to not interfere with the health or livelihood of some other individual. It is
more difficult to assert that we have a positive duty to promote—or maintain—the health and
well-being of other human beings. To see why both are true, consider re-stating this principle as
an obligation to promote human health and well-being through non-interference and positive
provisions. This argument is another way of approaching the topic of a general duty of
beneficence; from this line of reasoning, we have additional moral reasons to promote societal
well-being. If someone standing next to me has a heart attack (like in the case of The Basketball
Game), I have an obligation to promote their health. That does not change, even if I do not have
the skills necessary to effectively carry out that health promotion. But, as explored when talking
about obligations in the basketball game case, this shortcoming can be mitigated by another
individual—the aforementioned “division of moral labor” facilitated by medical doctors. 24
Thus, we arrive at what I believe to be the strongest case for strong obligation generation
in medical care: the fact that medical doctors are responsible for promoting an unconditional
value embodied in human health, well-being, and livelihood. Medical doctors are the individuals
responsible for maintaining and promoting the essence of human life: human health. That, I
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believe, generates strong obligations that must hold doctors accountable for not making efforts to
maintain or promote human health.
Sam Scheffler has argued that unconditionally valuable goods generate obligations to
promote or advance those goods. 25 Take, for example, a non-instrumental relationship (like a
close friendship). The relationship is not maintained “solely as a means to some independently
specified end,” so there are reasons to believe that my friend makes non-instrumental claims on
me that would otherwise be unreasonable for a miscellaneous person to make on me. This is
permissible because of the nature of the relationship; for something to be able to non-voluntarily
formulate responsibilities for me, it must be of a higher-order, unconditional value. Further, there
would be something wrong with turning my non-instrumental relationship into something
instrumental (or having it be formulated on an instrumental basis). Now, let us assume that my
close friend was assigned to me through giving money to an agency that leases out close
friendships. There seems to be something inherently wrong with commodifying something of
non-instrumental value.
Health is an unconditionally valuable good, and from Scheffler’s argumentation, it
follows that medical doctors are therefore obligated to provide for human health promotion. One
advantage of an unconditional value approach to justifying obligations in medical care is that it is
informed and supported by the preceding arguments for obligations while simultaneously
providing justification for those obligations. From Scheffler’s argument, there are also reasons to
believe that commodifying patient health—based on its non-instrumental nature—is wrong. To
gain something of instrumental value from a relationship of a non-instrumental nature is like
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paying for a close friendship or taking advantage of a spouse for profit: there seems to be
something non-instrumental undergoing degradation in these transactions.
A doctor is the individual responsible for human health promotion, a role that they willingly
assume. Doctors are the embodiment of a “division of moral labor” in human health promotion
(also an idea also explored by Samuel Scheffler). 26 Further, human health is not only a necessary
public good, but a value that is fundamental and unconditionally valuable. And, if nothing else,
doctors are well-positioned to promote the unconditional value of human health.
III.

The Medical Profit Motive is Inconsistent with Physician Obligations
Recall the discussion about the value of pizza. At one point, I introduced a hypothetical

situation where you wanted to kill a pizza vendor to obtain a free slice of pizza, which may have
seemed like an absurd situation to propose. Yet it is not so absurd when we acknowledge that
physicians consider monetary profit over human health promotion. These practices are both
morally unsound for a similar set of reasons. After all, in both cases, a rational agent would be
disrespecting an unconditional value for their own pursuit of an instrumental value like pizza or
money. Both of these cases are therefore impermissible ways of responding to unconditional
values. Doctors, especially with their set of strong obligations towards patients to promote
health, are morally blameworthy for not considering patient health over monetary gains (when
the two values are pitted against one another). Thus, physician obligations are pro tanto
incompatible with a medical profit motive, and thus, a medical profit motive is pro tanto
immoral.
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I have established that health has unconditional value, but I would like to speak briefly
about the “profit motive” as mentioned in this paper. Philosophers, including Buchanan and
Brock, have also addressed this topic and their analyses will be discussed later in this
argument. 27 To reiterate, I define a medical profit motive as the desire to maximize pecuniary
profit from patient care as a primary motivation in patient care. A medical profit motive is not
the same as medical cost considerations; I am asserting that the former is unethical and the latter
is responsible (when taken in isolation from one another). If a medical doctor is considering costs
to patients, costs to other patients, and costs to society when making medical decisions, this can
more easily be morally permissible. The situation changes when for-profit medical providers,
including doctors, go beyond cost considerations to consider their own monetary gains. 28
When profit motivated reasoning is injected into patient care, a medical provider is
objectifying the patient and performing a commodification of that patient’s health and wellbeing. To “objectify” a patient is to reduce the patient to something instrumental, like a
commodity. Patients are human beings, and their humanity should disallow a commodification
process to take place towards something fundamental to their humanity. The doctor-patient
relationship is a non-instrumental relationship that generates strong obligations, and it is wrong
to take advantage of it to produce instrumental goods. Patient health must exist outside the realm
of commodification; it is of a higher-order, unconditional value.
Throughout this discussion, I have assumed that whenever something is of unconditional
value, it carries significant moral weight. If two things of value are pitted against one another
27
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(meaning that promoting one value will disrespect or undermine the other value), the thing of
higher value must be promoted. I realize that sounds nebulous, so allow me to clarify this
determination. Even if, all things considered, item A is of a higher value than item B, does that
necessarily justify promoting item A over item B? Fortunately, human health can escape from
this tenuousness when being pitted against a medical profit motive because a medical profit
motive is something of instrumental value. No matter which way it is dissected, the desire for
medical providers to gain additional revenue is a relative, conditional value. Hardly anything
about our moral intuitions or any predominant moral theory would justify a model of the medical
profit motive being unconditionally valuable. 29
In other words, when something of unconditional value is weighed against something of
conditional value (and one must be promoted over the other), we should preserve the thing of
unconditional value. For example, slavery is immoral because slavery substitutes something of
conditional value (free labor) with something of unconditional value (autonomy, respect). This is
even true in cases where the “things” of unconditional value are weighted heavily in number
against the “things” of conditional value. Consider the case where a building is up in flames, and
in this building, the human race has managed to gather all of the greatest artistic achievements
over the last century. However, there is something else within the inflagration: a human baby. 30
You must choose to save the body of art that has been collected in the building or the human
baby, and you cannot save both. What would you save? There is no question that the art is
valuable, but I believe that most would agree that we would be morally required to save the
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child’s life. 31 Here, we can see that what must be at stake in value considerations—and choices
within those considerations—are not just considerations about the quantity of competing values,
but the types of values that are at stake. Applying this into the health vs. profit debate, it would
not be appropriate to consider the amount of profit at stake in medical decision-making when
unconditional values like health are in jeopardy of being undermined. 32
One may justify a medical profit motive in patient care, insofar as it does not undermine
proper patient care—which is the essence of a physician’s obligations. Yet I have argued that if a
doctor acts on a medical profit motive, and that motive is antagonistic towards the health of the
patient, in every case, the profit motive is morally impermissible. An unconditional value (like
patient health) cannot be valued over a conditional value (like profit). Even if a medical profit
motive is in accordance with promoting patient health, it is still immoral in this case because it is
pro tanto immoral to consider monetary profit in medical decision-making, but that immoral
characteristic can be overcome by beneficial patient outcomes. The fact that a profit motive is
prevalent in patient care is morally permissible so long as the medical doctor responsible for
patient care is promoting patient health to the fullest extent possible (again, independent of a
profit motive). In the negative interference cases, if doctors decide to undermine proper patient
care, they are not only acting against what is morally required from them, but they also are
31
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undermining the fundamental, implied mechanisms predicating medical care. If a medical doctor
does not act in accordance with the fundamental obligations that predicate moral patient care, it
cannot be said that they are an ethical doctor. The cases where a medical profit motive interferes
with and undermines the value of human health are enough to suggest that a medical profit
motive should not exist in medical decision-making, but some situations may permit such a
motive.
IV.

Profit Considerations in the Modern Doctor-Patient Relationship

I have developed a theory of value assignment and assessment in medical care related to
pecuniary profits. I will now show how this theory applies in real-world medical decisionmaking. Aspects of the modern medical field are sometimes driven by profit motive
considerations over considerations of patient health, and profit motive-driven care undermines
patient health more than is often perceived. A medical profit motive undermines patient health in
three ways: a medical profit motive—maintained by a medical doctor—compromises the health
of that doctor’s patient, compromises the health of other potential patients, and undermines the
standard of care that particular patient groups morally ought to receive.
First, a medical profit motive can compromise the health of individual patients. For
example, a physician or for-profit health system could benefit greatly (in the economic sense)
from over-treating particular medical ailments or conditions (another name for this case being
polypharmacy). 33,34 In some cases, physicians are driven to keep patients on sustained treatment

33

A formal definition of “polypharmacy” is “when an older adult patient, often over the age of 65, is
prescribed—and is taking—five or more medicines or treatments at one time.” Although this definition
exists, there is no exact medical definition of the term “polypharmacy”. Thus, when I refer to
polypharmacy in this argument, I am referring to the instance where a patient is prescribed—and is
taking—more than one pharmaceutical at a time. Additionally, I will use the term “polypharmacy” and

35

plans because they receive higher profits from having their patients stay on these treatment plans.
Jerome Schofferman addresses this issue in the field of Interventional Pain Medicine. As a pain
doctor, Schofferman makes the claim that “profit is an incentive to provide the best care
possible…[but] it is when profit becomes unreasonable that there is a problem;” Schofferman
goes on to say:
“Pain specialists may limit their practice to the most profitable patients—those
who require interventions such as injections or neuromodulation. They might
decline to see those patients who need only pharmacological management,
counseling, rehabilitation, or just support and advice. They may rationalize this
practice style by thinking, “it’s what I do best,” “it’s what I like to do,” or “it’s
what I was trained to do.” More disturbing might be, “I’ve got a lot of overhead,”
or “I’ve got to make a living.” 35
To prefer certain patients over others on an economic basis (even assuming that all patients being
considered are insured and can pay) is the ugly realization of the medical profit motive: choice
medical care that affects the livelihood of patient populations.
Within these cases, there are instances where physicians have the same motivations, but
they come at a higher additional cost to the patient: their health. Physicians may have an
economic interest to not only treat patients on a continual basis, but also to recommend treatment
plans or pharmaceuticals that they will receive a higher profit from prescribing. Profit-motivated
physicians could prescribe drugs even if the drugs are not the most effective defenses against
patient ailments, or even if some sustained treatment plans have additional health costs to a
patient (such as known or unknown negative health side effects). In these cases, side effects

“overprescription” to refer to the increased use of prescription medicine to treat medical ailments (so the
term may also be used to refer to a systemic issue).
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alone should be enough to caution medical doctors from over-treating their patients, because to
do so is harmful. 36 Several more focused studies confirm that polypharmacy negatively impacts
patient health. 37,38 When a medical profit motive starts to negatively impact patient health on a
direct level, the medical doctor facilitating the impact is at fault. In these cases, a medical profit
motive cannot justify over-treatment when patient health is at stake.
Second, a medical profit motive can compromise the health of larger patient populations
or other patients that a medical doctor might not have direct contact with. Consider the following
case to demonstrate the concept of a medical doctor imposing social costs:
The Prodigal Physician. A medical doctor M works for a hospital, so Dr. M does not
directly bear the costs associated with medical decision-making. Dr. M is especially
wasteful in medical decision-making, always keeping his patients within the hospital as
long as possible, prescribing the most expensive treatment plans for his patients, taking
the longest amount of time to see patients as possible, and performing other tasks
associated with medical care with no regard for costs. Dr. M receives increased profit
from increased medical cost.
When a medical doctor is imposing social costs on a system or on society as a result of a medical
profit motive, that profit motive should not be present in patient care. The idea of a social cost is
relatively simple: a social cost is a cost that is borne by a community, a system, or society rather
than a private cost, which is borne by an individual. 39 Certain medical decisions affect more than
just a single patient or the medical doctor making the decision. For instance, if a doctor were to
see a patient continually if it is not clinically indicated that a patient needs constantly renewing
visits, a doctor may monetarily benefit from that constant stream of visit costs. The monetary
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costs of continual patient visits are not the only costs to be considered in this situation; we must
also consider the time lost for the doctor to see other patients, patients who may require medical
attention. In other words, this example highlights that the profit motive can compromise overall
patient care if doctors allocate their time on the basis of monetary considerations rather than
good patient care.
Although doctors legally have the right to decide which patients to see, patients who have
the proper insurance have the right to see a physician if they so choose, and physicians can only
work a certain amount of hours within the day, I deny that these considerations are appropriate
enough to defend a profit-motivated model of patient care. Doctors—along with patients—need
to be more responsible and consider costs to the health of others as a result of prolonged (and
unnecessary) medical care.
The medical profit motive leads to additional negative health effects, some that may
materialize in more indirect ways (but are nonetheless caused by a physician being profitmotivated). Medical doctors have a monetary interest in becoming highly specialized within the
medical field, which has led to a shortage of primary care physicians. 40,41 In the United States,
the population is aging rapidly, which will require an increased number of primary care
physicians to address in the future. The United States is also expecting a huge increase in the
need for primary care physicians when the Affordable Care Act comes into full fruition. 42 Along
with the aging population and patient populations increasing, the country is experiencing a
40
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decrease of primary care physicians available and a decrease in the number of medically trained
individuals entering into primary care. 43 Here also, profit motivation affects the entire health care
system. As Arnold Reiman writes, the economic incentives of specialty practice “are attracting
the great majority of physicians into specialty practice, and these incentives, combined with the
continued introduction of new and more expensive technology, are a major factor in causing
inflation of medical expenditures.” 44 Again, medical doctors should have the autonomy to decide
what specialties within the medical field to focus their attentions towards, but that decision
cannot be irresponsible and void of societal considerations. A lucrative occupational choice is
not always the most moral choice even if it is morally permissible. No matter what field a
medical doctor decides to focus in, he must examine the condition of the medical field—and thus
the needs that the medical field displays. If there will be a deficiency of primary care doctors
moving forward with health care reform, there will be a large social cost associated with that
deficiency. 45 The responsibility to address this shortage falls—at least in the short-term—on the
doctors within the medical field. It is necessary that some doctors suspend their medical profit
motive for the social costs that may be resultant from increased medical specialization.
Third, a medical profit motive negatively impacts the entire medical field because a profit
motive can detract from—or sometimes can prevent—considerations about alternative treatment
plans or a focus on preventative medicine. Thus, some medically preferred treatment plans can
be overridden by monetarily preferred treatment plans. Based on our current medical incentive
structures, preventative medicine does not provide for increased profits, even though a focus on
43
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preventative medicine is undoubtedly in the best medical interest of most patients. Here, you can
see a situation where the interests of for-profit medical providers are in direct tension with the
obligations that medical providers have to promote patient health.
To see how this tension pans out in real-world medical care, consider treatment regimes
for Celiac disease (and its resultant gluten intolerance) that are premised on the idea that
preventative medicine is not as profitable as lifelong treatment, and therefore lifelong treatment
should be the governing model of patient care. According to The Celiac Disease Center at the
University of Chicago, Celiac disease afflicts “an estimated 3 million Americans,” yet only three
percent of the people afflicted by it are aware of the nature (and cure) of their illness. 46 If Celiac
disease is correctly diagnosed, the effective treatment is simply a gluten-free diet. 47 Doctors
theoretically have a monetary interest in treating the symptoms of Celiac disease, though,
because they do not see a monetary gain from advising gluten-free diets or championing
awareness of Celiac disease within relevant patient populations.
This is just one example of a problem with the medical profit motive in treatment of
medical ailments; treatment correlates with profit, regardless if it is clinically indicated that
treatment is needed or not. Alternative or less burdensome treatment plans (such as a diet
change) do not produce a profit, so the incentive to pursue such plans is not concrete. The
incentive, truly, should be a moral one, not one based on profit. This is not only an issue because
the commodification of human health—by placing health against monetary profit—is immoral in
the sense that disrespecting an unconditional value by promoting an instrumental value is pro
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tanto wrong, but the profit motive often leads to worse patient health outcomes. This situation is
absolutely impermissible.
V.

Some Objections to my Argument
In this section, I will address some arguments in opposition to my thesis. First, one may

argue that a doctor is merely a businessman. On such a view, if a doctor wishes to maintain a
medical profit motive and consider costs associated with medical care, that motive is not in
tension with his obligations. Proponents of this view may argue that for a medical doctor to be
fully autonomous and provide excellent patient care, he must be able to maintain a profit motive.
This objection prompts a clarification. When I claim that a medical doctor should not
consider monetary profit in patient care, I am not trying to suggest that he should not consider
the costs associated with medical care; that would be an inaccurate extension of my thesis. I fully
believe that cost considerations can exist within patient care because I believe that cost
consideration is one of the obligations that doctors have to patients and the health care system. A
fully responsible physician will be able to weigh cost considerations against treatment
effectiveness and patient health without compromising an ethical principle outlining patient care.
I argued above that a doctor is not foremost a businessman because he has especially
powerful obligations to promote patient health. Even if doctors are somehow businessmen within
the medical field, it does not necessarily follow that doctors gain the right to maintain a medical
profit motive—as demonstrated by the potential for a medical profit motive to undermine the
value of patient health. Medicine should not be considered a business. It is still morally not ideal
for a profit motive to exist in patient care, as evidence of a pro tanto wrongdoing that is
associated with any medical profit motive. When a doctor incurs professional obligations, he
41

forfeits some of his autonomy (to make any medical decision, regardless of patient outcomes) in
exchange for patient trust and the power to make medical decisions for a patient. 48
As I have indirectly mentioned throughout this argument, there are still situations where a
profit motive can exist in patient care. My argument does not seek to prevent all cases of profit
motivation in individual medical care (or, in other words, within the doctor-patient relationship).
The following case illustrates a scenario when the profit motive may be morally acceptable all
things considered:
The Greedy Neurosurgeon. Dr. Cash is the top neurosurgeon in the world, so when a
relevant patient is treated by Dr. Cash, they receive the best possible medical care.
However, Dr. Cash is not motivated by promoting patient health and well-being; Dr. Cash
happens to charge large sums of money for his services, and he is driven to provide
excellent patient care solely based on large profits.
Based on the foregoing arguments, there is still something wrong with medical care being driven
by profits, but The Greedy Neurosurgeon case illustrates that medical outcomes can overcome
the wrongness of commodifying health. If a medical doctor avoids profit considerations in
medical decision making, it would be morally ideal; this scenario, of course, should be weighed
against the scenario where profit considerations are abolished along with optimal patient health
outcomes.
I acknowledge that completely removing the potential for a medical profit motive in
patient care would remove a significant portion of motivation for physicians to provide excellent
health care services, even though this is not morally ideal. In the case of The Greedy
Neurosurgeon, a profit motive can exist because it is utilized to promote the most optimal health
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outcomes for his patients. But insofar as a medical profit motive exists and acts antagonistically
towards promoting optimal patient health outcomes the profit motive is morally impermissible.
One may also object that medical doctor is simply a health consultant for a patient. If so,
then doctors do not have a responsibility to promote patient health in all situations. One may ask,
“Doesn’t patient satisfaction and happiness matter too?” Proponents of this position assert that an
individual’s well-being is their own value to selectively maintain, and it would be a violation of
preventions towards medical paternalism to try and claim that patient happiness should not be the
motivating factor in medical decision-making. In this argumentation, it would be unethical to
make a claim on the value of another individual’s health.
Patient happiness and satisfaction is significant, but it would matter more if it were not
for the fact that patients are often “weak agents” in the medical decision-making process. Debra
Satz, in a paper discussing the moral considerations behind organ markets, defines “weak agency”
as the situation where “an agent who is either ignorant of the consequences of his actions or is
not directly involved in the transaction…relies on another person to transact on his behalf.” 49 In
this definition, patients seeing a medical doctor are weak agents over medical decision-making
relating to their own health. A patient may desire a particular treatment plan, but since they—on
balance—have limited knowledge about human medicine, they cannot make a fully informed
and appropriate decision about their treatment, albeit they cannot carry out most treatment plans
without the counsel or action from a medical doctor.
Since it has been shown that patient health is of unconditional value, if a medical doctor
operated with a primary motivation being patient happiness and satisfaction, it could be possible
49

Satz, Debra. "XIV-The Moral Limits of Markets: The Case of Human Kidneys." Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 108, no. 3 (2008): 269-88. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00246.x.

43

that they would be acting impermissibly because they could allow patient health to be
compromised for something else of conditional, instrumental value: happiness. 50 For this reason,
if patient happiness is something of instrumental value, then the argument that I have developed
throughout this chapter applies, and patient happiness then cannot be promoted over patient
health. This does not mean that a medical doctor should disregard patient happiness and
satisfaction completely; there is still an element of respecting patient happiness that comes along
with moral patient care. Something of instrumental value is still something valuable to an agent.
It is when this instrumental value could potentially undermine the value of something
unconditionally valuable, like human health, that a problem arises.
VI.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that a medical profit motive is incompatible with

ethical patient care, but may be able to still exist when considering patient health outcomes. I
first outlined the ways in which a medical doctor has strong obligations towards his patients, and
from that discussion, I showed that these obligations are premised on promoting patient health
and livelihood. Due to the nature of these strong obligations, medical doctors cannot
simultaneously maintain a medical profit motive and consider patient health; patient health
should be their primary consideration.
50

This position may be interpreted to be at odds with a prevention of medical paternalism, and I am
endorsing medically paternalistic action. First, consider that I am simply discussing this idea in the
context of patient happiness being a primary motivation. I firmly believe that patient happiness matters in
medical decision-making, but it cannot be what drives physicians to treat ailments and choose patient
discourses. If that were the case, medical decision-making would lose effectiveness. If patient happiness
was the ultimate barometer to guide physician decision-making (i.e. the happiest patient was the one that
was treated most effectively), doctors would become glorified drug dealers: prescribing patients nothing
but morphine to combat their medical ailments would produce the happiest patients. Clearly, our
intuitions tell us that there is something wrong with this situation. In addition, this position should not be
interpreted to mean that patient happiness—materialized into medical decisions—should not be factored
into treatment plans; my argument considers that refusal to care is a legitimate and important check on
paternalistic decision-making in medicine.
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From this discussion, it may seem as though I am being very critical towards medical
doctors. Despite the foregoing ethical argument against a medical profit motive, I acknowledge
that medical doctors operate in a complex field driven by a large number of considerations and
responsibilities. I do not believe that the existence of a medical profit motive is entirely the fault
of the medical doctor, so in the next chapter I will explore the existence and unfortunate
fostering of the medical profit motive by agents other than the medical doctor. There, I argue
that physician incentive structures are ethically flawed, and they ought to change to act in
accordance with relevant moral principles in patient care. On a systemic level, new issues arise
that further suggest that a medical profit motive is immoral to maintain when administering over
patient care.
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Chapter II: The Medical Profit Motive in Medical Administration
“It is undeniable that for-profit health care involves potential conflicts between the interests of
providers (physicians, managers, administrators, and stock-holders) and those of patients. In the
most general terms, the conflict is simply this: an institution with a strong, if not an overriding,
commitment to maximizing profit may sometimes find that the best way to do this is not to act in
its patients’ best interests.” 51

In the previous chapter, I discussed cases where a medical profit motive is carried out by
a singular medical doctor. There, I suggested that the negative outcomes that result from certain
medical profit motives are enough to tell against the existence of a medical profit motive in all
medical care. The elimination of profit motives would be an ideal scenario if we, as a society,
could uphold all moral principles strictly (that is, if we could be moral saints). 52 However, even
though a medical profit motive commodifies patient health and is pro tanto wrong, we cannot
halt these motivations or criticize any singular medical doctor for operating within our current
medical system so long as they are optimally promoting patient health with a profit motive.
The same logic does not apply to bodies of medical doctors or to administrators of large
medical organizations with direct patient impact. For these agents, maintaining a medical profit
motive on a meta-patient, organizational level introduces new levels of moral concern that afford
them fewer excuses to commit the wrongdoings associated with a medical profit motive.
My thesis in this chapter is that a medical profit motive—pursued by organizations or
maintained on an organizational level—is morally worse than a medical profit motive maintained
within a patient-doctor relationship. A medical profit motive on an administrative level is
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especially morally wrong because it fosters and facilitates further systemic wrongdoing. When a
medical organization maintains a profit motive, they not only commodify patient health, they
coerce medical practitioners into committing a similar commodification and pressure one another
into considering monetary gain over optimal patient health promotion. This profit motive is
especially wrong when the individuals maintaining the medical profit motive are not medical
professionals, thereby rendering them almost entirely unable to properly value human health and
well-being in medical decision-making.
The medical organization operates in two separate “firms”—the medical staff and the
administrative staff. Each face different challenges, require different criteria for performance,
and are normatively different. 53 The leadership structure of medical organizations do not face the
same type of pressures that medical practitioners face, so it is harder to justify operating in an
immoral system when changes could feasibly be made to align profit-driven practices with
medically optimal practices.
Some may reply that this position would be an impossible business model to uphold or
would be overzealously attacking the issue of business considerations within medical care. This
thesis is not directly concerned with business considerations; the moral travesties that result from
a systemic medical profit motive defeat any considerations of profit. I am engaging in ideal
theory in this chapter, which intends to lay out the moral facts behind administrators’ medical
profit motives. 54 These moral facts can—and will be—engaged and interpreted differently, and I
am not attempting to outline the exact ways that a moral medical organization ought to weigh
53
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pecuniary considerations against patient care decisions. I will offer some suggestions for medical
organizations, but my mission here is to tease out the moral facts within an administrative
medical profit motive so that they can be prepared for real-world application.
To clarify the role of ideal theory in our moral reasoning, consider the following thought
experiment from David Estlund. Imagine the morally ideal reality of a situation (M) as a “picnic
spot” on a distant—yet visible—hill. If we desired to find the best picnic spot to have a picnic,
we would surely want to reach the best picnic spot, M. Now, suppose that the M picnic spot was
unreachable because the hill was surrounded by a terribly lethal fog that instantly killed any
morally imperfect individual who passed through it. Since we could not reach M or it would not
make sense to try to reach M, that does not mean we should deny the fact that M is the best
picnic spot. Knowing about M also has value because we can still find and analyze other picnic
spots based on the qualities that we see in M. 55 In the same way, determining how the morally
ideal medical organization should be organized does not call for a medical organization to
completely overhaul their existing structure. This analysis is pursued so that the moral facts of
their operation can inform future action, invoke self-reflection, and create an ideal for moral
reference.
In Section I, I further explore the case of The Greedy Neurosurgeon from Chapter I. I
then compare it to a new case that intends to introduce an organizational medical profit motive in
order to uncover what truly separates the profit motives of these different agents. From this
analysis, I delineate what I believe to be the most compelling reasons that an organizationally
maintained medical profit motive (which I will abbreviate as an “OM medical profit motive”) is
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more morally wrong than an individually maintained medical profit motive (which I will
abbreviate as an “IM medical profit motive”). In Section II, I demonstrate how the wrongdoing
of a profit-motivated medical administrator is heightened due to the leadership position (and
resultant agency) that the administrator holds. Leaders of a medical organization are more
morally blameworthy due to their responsibility for collective wrongdoings. In contrast, doctors
are coerced by leaders—directly or indirectly—into wrongdoing.
In Section III, I argue that medical administrators are afforded fewer excuses for
wrongdoing and can more reasonably be expected to change a system predicating immoral
medical decision-making, rather than simply operating within it and accepting some moral
blameworthiness in order to come out with optimal patient health and well-being. For this
reason, an administrator’s maintaining of a profit motive is especially wrong. In Section IV, I
argue that besides the patient, medical decisions (or decisions impacting patient health and wellbeing) should be made by medical experts, and when non-medical experts commodify human
health and well-being in order to compare patient outcomes against a profit motive, they are
especially susceptible to wrongdoing. In Section V, I consider two objections to my position that
challenge the obligations within medical administration and the practicality of my position. In
Section VI, I offer suggestions on how medical administration can be revised—and can
commit—to promote ethical medical practices and decision-making processes.
I.

The Medical Profit Motive Revisited: Does The Agent Matter?

In Chapter I, I argued that The Greedy Neurosurgeon’s profit motivations are pro tanto
morally wrong, but the wrongness of the situation is outweighed by the value of good medical
outcomes for Dr. Cash’s patients. While cases where a medical profit motive positively
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correlates with patient health and well-being allow for moral excuses in particular cases, the
same cannot be said for the systemic issues that are presented from a medical profit motive.
Consider a similar case:
The Greedy Administration. Cash for Health Hospital is the top hospital in the world for
cardiac surgery, so when a relevant patient is treated in Cash for Health Hospital, they
receive the best possible medical care. However, Cash for Health Hospital is not
motivated by promoting patient health and well-being; Cash for Health Hospital happens
to charge large sums of money for their services, and the administration is driven to
provide excellent patient care solely based on large profits.
Obviously, this scenario is a bit unrealistic considering hospital administrators must be
concerned with at least a baseline of patient health and safety (in order to exist and function as
an organization, let alone a hospital). Nevertheless, the administrators of Cash for Health
Hospital are an instructive caricature of some modern healthcare institutions.
In contrast to The Greedy Neurosurgeon, The Greedy Administration is more culpable for
the moral penalties associated with a medical profit motive. In Chapter I, I established that
medical doctors have a strong obligation to promote patient health and well-being based on nonprofit motives. This idea was challenged by the case of The Greedy Neurosurgeon. On one hand,
profit-motivated medical doctors are morally blameworthy for commodifying patient health and
valuing it against profit, and on the other hand, medical doctors are morally blameworthy if they
do not optimally promote patient health and well-being. Thus, The Greedy Neurosurgeon forces
one to concede that, aside from the pro tanto wrongness that is associated with health
commodification, physician profit-motivation can be justified only when it is maintained in order
to uphold the strong obligation to promote patient health. Even then, it is not as though a profitmotivated physician is praised for being self-aware of their ability to on-balance justify a profit
motivation; there is still a component of wrongness to health commodification that is undesirable.
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This component is teased out and amplified in cases such as The Greedy Administration
because health commodification on a systemic level comes at a higher moral price. The
obligation to promote patient health and well-being is shared among medical practitioners and
medical administrators, but the role obligations that develop from these respective positions are
also inherently different. Administrators in medicine segment their attention between providing
excellence in patient care with running a business. I am not suggesting that medical doctors who
practice on an individual level are not concerned with running a business; I am simply claiming
that administrators in medical organizations have a unique, impersonal obligation to sustain their
business. An adminsitrator’s obligation is unique because it is further removed from direct
patient care and is a crucial aspect of his role and function in medical care. If medical doctors or
groups of medical doctors maintain a business, they have no obligation (per se) to run a
profitable enterprise. They might maintain a profit motive, but their strongest obligations are to
promote patient health and well-being. Medical administrators have obligations, based on their
position, to maintain a profitable enterprise. These obligations do not reflect the moral facts of
patient care, however. Obligations from an administrative role cannot be confused with
obligations that stem from the unconditional value of patient health (and the unconditional value
of the doctor-patient relationship). Unfortunately, this is what links their role with the wrongness
of a systemic profit motive: the agents that lead the business of medicine—the immoral aspect of
medical practice—are absolutely more culpable for the wrongdoing which stems from
commodifying and improperly valuing patient health.
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In the following three sections, I will introduce the main reasons that I believe an OM
medical profit motive by a medical administrator is more wrong to maintain than an IM medical
profit motive by a medical doctor. 56
II.

Responsibility

The first aspect of an OM medical profit motive that distinguishes itself morally from an
IM medical profit motive is the idea that there can be a hierarchy of culpability when a leader is
overseeing a collective wrongdoing. When considering acts of wrongdoing, it is not always
adequate to conduct an examination under the lens of individual actions. Sometimes, actions
carried out from groups or organizations are immoral, but it is not always immediately obvious
when we look at individual effort/action that each member of the group takes an equal (or any)
share of moral blame for the immoral action. 57
Take, for example, a case where three individuals (A, B and C) work together in order to
stab another individual, D, to death. 58 The individual contribution from A, B, or C would not, in
isolation, be enough to actually murder D. In a way, we cannot morally accuse A, B, or C with
murdering D because assuming other contributions were not made to the murderous action, not
one of the attackers would be considered a murderer. This example challenges our idea of
individual responsibility in wrongdoing because we intuitively know that all of the three
participants should be morally responsible for murder, but no single individual’s action killed
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D. 59 To account for this shortcoming, we must analyze individual responsibility within collective
action.
In Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing, Brian Lawson addresses the
responsibility of individuals for collective wrongs. 60 Lawson’s position is that any contributor,
no matter the degree, is accountable for the wrongdoing of a group if they knowingly contribute
to a harmful outcome that stems from the group participation. This position, Lawson
acknowledges, is met with some hostility. His “Modified Complicity Principle” seems to assign
equal blame to wrongdoing that stems from participation among active group leadership and
minimally participative group members alike. 61 To counter this objection, Lawson replies that a
causal approach to harm assessment does not fully capture what is important when assigning
moral blame for contributions within a collective action.
I agree with this general analysis, but I do not agree with the final position adopted by
Lawson. A minimalist model of individual responsibility within organizational action cannot
properly account for external factors that have influence over the agency within collective action
schemes. On Lawson’s view, if a company is accused of deceiving their shareholders, the
executive council, the managers within the company, the human resources department, and the
individuals working in the mailroom (who ultimately send and receive postage relating to this
wrongdoing) share the same share of wrongdoing. For this reason, I reject the notion that the
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characteristics of a particular collective of individuals have no influence on the method of which
we should assign individual moral blame.
There must be a division of responsibility in collective wrongdoing, but it need not be
equal. On my view, group leadership ultimately must accept a larger portion of moral blame for
collective wrongdoing in most scenarios. This position is similar to Kutz’s model of individual
responsibility within collective action, which separates agents within collective action schemes
into those with executive intentions and those with subsidiary intentions.62 Agents who fall into
the category of having executive intentions ultimately drive collective action by setting collective
goals and determining individual actions, while those with subsidiary intentions “rationalize their
activity with reference to the executive intentions.” 63 I will not argue that those with executive
intentions, whom I am calling leaders, are the only ones who can accept blame for collective
wrongdoings. I do believe that leaders must be held more accountable for the moral penalties
associated with collective action.
As a modification of the above thought experiment, let us take the same three individuals
with murderous intentions (A, B, and C) and assume that, within their collective, A is the leader.
A has determined and directed that the three will stab D at the same time, and because B and C
are subsidiaries to A (for whatever the reason may be; we can assume that they are employees),
they follow direction from A. It is unreasonable to assume that B and C do not accept any moral
blame just because they are following direction from A, but at the same time, it is reasonable to
place more moral blame on the one who directs the efforts of the two stabbers, or in general, the
one who directs the efforts that collectively result in wrongdoing. Lawson tries to accommodate
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this intuition in his Modified Complicity Principle, but I believe that he falls short—at least in
the fact that his principle lacks practical application. The earlier case about the deceitful
company displays not only that Lawson’s account does not align with our intuitions, but that it is
an unreasonable position to maintain when trying to apply a theory of wrongdoing in collective
action. Applying Kutz’s account into this case, the wrongdoing would be reasonably split
between the vastly different agents in the scheme of wrongdoing: the executives and the
subsidiaries.
Lawson also argues that accountability in collective wrongdoing can only be assigned to
agents who knowingly contribute to collective wrongdoing. This is also a misguided position
because it also falls short in application to theoretical cases (so staying within ideal theory). In
theory, if stabbers B and C have no idea that murder is immoral or do not realize that their
stabbing action can murder someone, some might be ready to state that they are not culpable for
the murderous action. This situation happens to be premised around a wrongdoing that hardly
any moral theory would agree is morally reprehensible: murder. When the wrongdoing becomes
less clear if it is morally reprehensible (or it is not generally known that a collective action is
morally wrong), individuals within those collective action schemes can still be held morally
responsible. For instance, if a hunter believes that a deer does not have a moral status (because it
lacks a rational capacity) and proceeds to hunt it for food, if we discovered that the deer had a
moral status similar to human beings, it would not let the hunter off the hook morally. This is a
similar claim to stating that the slave owners of the past were still morally accountable for
enslaving other human beings, even though the popular held view was that those subject to
becoming enslaved peoples lacked the inherent right to autonomy.
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Lawson believes agents in collective action are separated into the ignorant and the
informed related to the moral facts predicating a certain collective action scheme. Even though
ignorance towards wrongdoing is more complex than Lawson argues for, it cannot be a
justification for wrongdoing. This is the wrong way of approaching the situation, especially
because ignorance is not morally ideal if it can be overcome. In administration of medical
services, administrators may not know that maintaining a profit motive is immoral, but it does
not necessarily let them off the hook morally. Individuals with an IM profit motive and an OM
profit motive are both morally required to not commodify patient health and well-being by
pitting those values against something of conditional value like money. When dealing with
unconditionally valuable things in a morally risky environment, there is an obligation to inform
oneself about the moral facts of action in that environment. This is especially true when an
individual is responsible for directing organizational action (in the medical field, when an
individual has an OM medical profit motive) and has access to information conveying the
relevant moral facts is accessible.
When one leads others with a conflicting motivation to obtain pecuniary profits, a
motivation that results in an expectation of medical practitioners to pursue a similar
commodification process, it is far more immoral because of the scope and moral risk involved in
this motivation. Leaders are especially responsible for collective wrongdoing in part because
they oversee many different agents who potentially act wrongly. Similar to the case of the three
stabbers, medical administrators with an OM medical profit motive are responsible for directing
the efforts of their subsidiaries to create a collective wrongdoing. Yet, administrators may even
be worse than the stabbers because with an OM medical profit motive, collective action does not
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produce one singular wrongdoing. Rather, repeated wrongdoings are the consequence of
leadership actions towards directing profit-influenced patient care.
This difference in attribution of moral wrongdoing is especially true when considering
collective wrongdoing in large organizations where things of great value, such as health, are
harmed within broader schemes. While the stabber case is not directly analogous to pro tanto
wrongdoing within patient-doctor relationships being overseen by medical administration, it is
sufficient for us to imagine in this way. Leaders are uniquely responsible because even if pro
tanto wrongdoing by individuals is justified when considering all relevant factors that are
inputted into a decision, if that pro tanto wrongdoing can be avoided by a leader, then it is not all
things considered justified for the leader to encourage behavior that is pro tanto wrong.
In sum, collective wrongdoing in medical organizations is actually an aggregate of
several wrongdoings that is overseen by leaders who have leadership obligations acting
antagonistically to values that should be upheld. It is not enough to suggest that culpability can
be assigned to those who are aware of collective wrongdoing. Profit-driven medicine is
inherently immoral, and agents acting within this scheme of medical administration should be
mindful of their responsibility to optimally promote patient health (or avoid harming patient
health), even if it is in tension with their role as business leaders. Medical administrators are
responsible for wrongdoings within organizational medical care, even if individual doctors are
only guilty of pro tanto wrongdoings. Additionally, as the agents responsible for cultivating the
structure of immoral practices in patient care, administrators are more morally accountable for
wrongdoing than individual medical practitioners.
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Leadership is premised on accepting greater responsibility for collective action. Leaders
must expect a heightened attention to morality when engaging in acts of leadership. 64 The moral
stakes are higher for collective actions, whether it is morally beneficial or morally reprehensible.
In medicine and other areas that involve tremendously valuable and essential objects, this is
especially the case. The livelihood and well-being of human beings are at stake in medical
decision-making, and when someone leads an organization that oversees these decision-making
processes, they must accept more moral accountability, even if their direct actions do not produce
the morally reprehensible outcomes. That is the moral price paid for leading a medical
organization: less justification for wrongdoing and more responsibility in maintaining—through
a profit motive—the wrongdoing that results from medical practice influenced by financial
considerations.
III.

Excuses

The second reason that those with an OM medical profit motive are more morally
blameworthy for allowing a medical profit motive to influence decision-making is the fact that
these individuals have fewer excuses for acting wrongly (in the context of the profit motive). It
goes without saying that medical practitioners are not victims or helpless in schemes of
wrongdoing. As I delineated in Chapter I, there are moral standards that must be upheld when
engaging in the doctor-patient relationship. Nevertheless, doctors and administrators operate
under different pressures and are afforded moral excuses in different ways. In the environment of
the medical organization, a medical administrator does not have the same ability to justify
maintaining a profit motive as a physician.
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There are several ways to think about excuses within schemes of wrongdoing. I intend to
demonstrate that those with IM medical profit motives have more excuses for their wrongdoings.
Agents within collective action schemes are more or less excused for wrongdoing insofar as
those with heightened agency in organizations can influence action. More specifically, coercion
can influence collective action, and if a collective action—or an individual action—is coercively
forwarded, it influences where blame should be assigned for wrongdoing.
The concept of coercion exists in many different contexts, so I will introduce what I
believe to be the conditions necessary for when coercion exists:
Values-centered coercion: An action A is coercive if it forces an agent to choose between
two things of morally disproportionate value.
On this account, a coercive act forces an agent to choose between something of conditional value
and something of unconditional value, which is wrong because of its lack of fairness and respect
towards unconditional values, such as the affected individual’s agency. If a mugger points a gun
at you and exclaims, “Your money or your life,” the mugger is coercing you because he is pitting
the unconditional value of your life against the conditional value of money, something that is
immoral for him to do. 65 If two things of unconditional value are being pitted against one another
in a coercive act (something such as a mugger proposing “your agency or your life”) is also a
form of values-centered coercion; forcing a choice even between two unconditionally valuable
things—things that ought not to be given value so as to weigh them against other values—is
coercive in nature. If two things of conditional value are being pitted against one another, on my
account, I do not believe there is coercion taking place. 66
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In the stabbers case, without considering the nature of leadership that exists between A
and his followers, we can recognize wrongdoing that is shared by all the stabbers. We have not
even at this point considered why B and C were acting antagonistically or how they came to act
in such a way. Suppose that A threatens B and C with the potential of ending their lives if they
do not stab D. This case is clearly a form of coercion; B and C, without any other choices, are
faced with a difficult decision that seems to free them of at least some portion of moral blame. B
or C must choose between two unconditional values to disrespect, and because A is forcing that
choice, they are utilizing values-centered coercion. It cannot entirely justify B or C’s decision to
stab D, but knowing that B and C were coerced into acting in this manner helps us understand
that the normative nature of leadership can have influence on the culpability for wrongdoing in
collective action—especially in the light of unconditional and conditional values. Thus, we can
see how B and C could have some form of moral excuse for operating under coercive leadership.
This idea is applicable to an argument on responsibility for wrongdoing in organizations
introduced by Philip Pettit in which Pettit identifies three conditions that must be in place to
consider an agent fully responsible for wrongdoing: value relevance, value judgment, and value
sensitivity. 67 Pettit then explains that upon one or more of the conditions for responsibility not
being met, one can begin to assign “partial responsibility,” a concept that is tied to moral excuse
in the proper context.
The concept behind an agent needing value reference is relevant because that means
something of moral importance must be at stake within a wrongdoing for this argument to apply;
I have established that this is the case when discussing the profit motive in medicine (health is
unconditionally valuable), so I will not further discuss the value reference condition. Next, value
me $100 or I will break your car windows,” it may be a wrongful use of force, but on the values-centered
account, that would not be considered a coercive action.
67
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judgment is the idea that an agent has the capacity to make value assessments for decisions that
are under moral assessment. I will discuss this condition later. The condition that I am concerned
with in relation to the aforementioned case of coercion is the condition of value sensitivity, which
states that an agent “has the control necessary for being able to choose between options on the
basis of judgments about their value.” 68 This is related to coercion because coercion, by
definition, “diminishes [a] targeted agent's freedom and responsibility.” 69 This definition
comports with the account of coercion I defended above. On both accounts, value assessment is
at the heart of coercive action, and if this assessment is hindered by an action or an action creates
an inappropriate comparison between values, that action is coercive in nature.
Medical practitioners are not coerced through a violation of their bodily integrity, but
they do face differing forms of values-centered coercion in medical organizations, forms of
coercion that medical administrators do not face. If a doctor approaches the doctor-patient
relationship while being observed or analyzed—through the medium of monetary value—by
organizational leadership, it creates an inorganic, morally risky environment for patient care.
Medical practitioners are in the best position to know what treatment plans are medically
necessary for patients, and within reason, administrators ought not to interfere with this process.
(This is assuming that we are also dealing with medical practitioners who are responsible and
socially conscious, factors that are vital for doctors to exhibit in order to strive for a more
morally sound medical organization.) When “greater control by management”—or more
actualized forms of coercion in verbal formats—begins to seep into a physician’s actions, it
makes it more difficult on the medical doctor to uphold his role obligations. In these cases, the
physician’s wrongdoing is in part the fault of medical administration.
68
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To introduce some examples of this, one might imagine that an administrative order is
related to patient volumes in a certain clinical services sector of a hospital (i.e. the radiology
department, a pain treatment center, etc.). The administration realizes that the sector is not
receiving enough patient volume, so they try and competitively incentivize physicians to direct a
portion of their patient traffic—through a treatment plan—through this sector of the hospital,
even if may not have been medically necessary in isolation of a competitive incentive (especially
if that sector is normally profitable) and even if there is some health risk involved with treatment
from that sector of the hospital. Additionally, if an administrative body agrees to prescribe X
amount of pharmaceuticals or they have purchased a large number of a particular brand of
pharmaceuticals, there may be administrative actions in place that incentivize physicians to
utilize these medical resources, even if would on balance lead to worse health outcomes. In these
cases, if a medical doctor is a victim of values-centered coercion, he is relieved of some moral
blame. The classic case of the mugger can be related to patient care; a doctor may be forced to
choose between “your job/pay or patient health”, “your autonomy or your patient health”, etc.,
situations that are not morally favorable. 70
In medical administration, leaders can act coercively to produce desired pecuniary
outcomes, so medical practitioners are coerced by administrators to perform morally
reprehensible actions. 71 Theoretically, a medical organization is organized to try and separate the
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on the administrative level. On the administrative level, the decision that must be made—by the
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two conditionally valuable things. Thus, my account of coercion does not apply to the medical
administrator.
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costs borne and the profits made by medical practitioners and medical administrators, something
that is akin to “(making) doctors look like individual entrepreneurs who happen to conduct their
business on the hospital's premises.” 72 In actual practice however, these two entities are
economically linked. Administrators do not have an influence in direct patient care, but they
indirectly have influence via external pressure on a practitioner to meet a standard or a
benchmark relating to patient care or the preemptive interference resulting from administrative
practices. This influence can be enough to raise moral alarm and force us to reconsider blame for
collective wrongdoing.
Intentions behind profit-motivated actions can also offer moral excuses to certain agents.
The intentions of those in The Greedy Administration are more inexcusable than those of doctors
for two reasons. First, a motive of this nature is sustained due to one thing (similar to the IM
profit motive): increased profit. 73 Those with a profit motive—like the Greedy Neurosurgeon—
will never be fully justified, but the moral harm involved can be somewhat mitigated because the
neurosurgeon provides optimal patient care and acts on an individual basis. In contrast, at an
administrative or organizational level the profit motive more often than not negatively impacts
patient health and well-being and affects more people.
Second, the intention to make a profit is not enough to justify profit-motivated action
considering the moral risk involved in profit-motivated organizational decision-making in the
medical field. An OM profit motive is especially risky compared to an IM profit motive due to

can see how an organizationally-maintained desire for profit resultant from patient care conflicts with the
obligations of physicians to promote the well-being of the patient
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the scale that an OM profit motive is maintained on. An OM profit motive involves countless
medical transactions and has the potential to harm patient health on a much larger scale. Thus, it
involves a degree of moral risk that is undesirable. As Dan Moller has argued, when something
involves moral risk and can be avoided, it ought to be avoided. 74 An OM medical profit motive
has no morally sustentative defense that would tell in its favor, and the risks associated with
maintaining an OM medical profit motive are not worth the moral cost.
Another major difference between the administrator and the practitioner that allows the
latter the opportunity for moral excuse in medical decision-making is the amount of agency—or
the degree to which one can impact change. 75 Medical practitioners are decision-makers, but
medical decisions are only made in the medical organization under the umbrella of
administrative practices. A doctor must be allowed to make what decisions he deems medically
necessary, so the patient-doctor relationship should be free from direct administrative control.
Even well-motivated doctors still cannot resist indirect controls on medical decision-making
(such as administrative policies, capacity issues, asset management) without being deemed as
“disobedient” or resisting administration. For indirect controls on patient care that produce
morally harmful outcomes, doctors have the excuse of decreased agency in the management of
the medical organization that denatures their portion of culpability for those wrongdoings. 76
Those who set immoral policies in place or administer through the medium of immoral policy do
not have the excuse of being under immoral regulation; they have the ability to change policies
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in the medical organization. This ought to be the ultimate responsibility of medical
administrators.
IV.

Expertise

The final reason I believe that an OM medical profit motive is more immoral than an IM
medical profit motive is because of the amount of medical expertise required for moral medical
decision-making. Under the current system, influence over medical practice does not correlate
with the amount of medical expertise one holds. Here, I am troubled by the fact that the
individuals with the most agency in medical organizations are largely not medically trained.
With medical training comes a particular ability to value human health, and if a role associated
with large-scale health commodification (an inherently immoral practice) does not require
medical training, that allows for a heightened degree of wrongdoing to be associated with that
role. An OM medical profit motive that is forwarded by a non-medical professional is a recipe
for exacerbated wrongdoing in patient care.
The role of the non-medical medical leader has developed within the healthcare
environment of hospitals. According to Alison Dwyer, medical administrators initially
functioned “as Medical Superintendents, who were often senior clinicians and statesmen within
the organization.” Initially, “these positions were usually well-defined, focussing on overseeing
clinical services of the hospital with the matron, and with little interaction with the finances of
the hospital.” Unfortunately, “in response to the increasingly complex healthcare system,
burgeoning new technologies and high cost of healthcare, the role and responsibilities of a
Medical Administrator have subsequently diversified” to encompass more business
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considerations. 77 Today in the United States, the majority of hospitals are led by non-medical
professionals; a study in 2009 found that “of the 6500 hospitals in the US, only 235 are led by
physicians.” 78
Given that this is a prevalent phenomenon, hospital administration is an important moral
issue. Imagine if a law firm was led by someone who has never attended law school and this
individual—along with a team of firm administrators with a similar skill set—was responsible
for determining best practices and policies for the firm and growing the business of the firm.
Something about this dynamic is unsettling. Although the firm is a business at its core, the idea
of a non-legal professional overseeing the operations of a legal group is counterintuitive.
I will not try and defend legal licensing as being unconditionally valuable, but imagine if
this same scenario involved decisions affecting unconditional values (which is where the analogy
to medicine and medical administration can then be drawn). Human health is unconditionally
valuable, and even though someone like myself—void of medical expertise—can recognize that
fact, without medical experts, the value of health cannot be properly recognized and cannot be
recognized on a case-to-case basis, a condition necessary for moral medical decision-making. A
medical expert is in a unique position to recognize the health state and health needs of a patient
because they have spent years understanding human physiology and the nature of human health.
This intimate knowledge of biological humanity allows someone to not only further appreciate
that humanity, but understand what is truly affected by a medical decision (on the physiological
level).
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Considering the importance of expertise, it is even easier to see why The Greedy
Neurosurgeon permissibly operated despite his health commodification practices whereas The
Greedy Administration acted impermissibly. The administration is profit-driven without
reference to the scientific appreciation and knowledge of what drives their business functions. A
non-medical professional with an OM medical profit motive may try and supplant knowledge of
health administration for knowledge of human health, but that cannot succeed in a moral domain.
One might object that the fact of a medical administrator having little to no medical
expertise would lend itself to decreased culpability in medical profit-motivated wrongdoing.
This thought can be derived because one might link knowledge of wrongdoing with culpability
for wrongdoing. However, ignorance does not morally justify a non-medical professional
overseeing medical decision-making (as I have argued in the earlier section about responsibility).
Consider the following example, which illustrates the relationship between ignorance and
culpability. If a six-year-old child is placed into the driver’s seat of a car and is allowed to
operate the motor vehicle on a road, and if that child runs over someone, you cannot hold the
child culpable for that wrongdoing. This position seems to be at odds with the account of excuse
in wrongdoing I have previously argued for, but it is not. The child may be entirely non-culpable
not because of ignorance to the moral facts behind running other human beings over with a car,
but also because of incapacity to understand the wrongness of their initial position or role as caroperator. There is no reliable reason why a child—lacking the capacity—could be expected to
exit a state of ignorance towards the moral facts of vehicle operation (i.e. you can end someone’s
life, and that life is unconditionally valuable). Yet the same cannot be said about a medical
administrator; they may be ignorant to the moral facts of medical care if they do not possess a
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certain degree of medical expertise, but they are not incapable of examining or changing their
role based on the moral facts they should become informed about.
Reversing this argument, one might claim that a medical doctor must accept increased
culpability for wrongdoing because of their unique position (their medical knowledge) to
recognize the degree of wrongdoing occurring in profit-motivated medical decision-making.
Medical knowledge is significant, which is why it would be better for medical doctors to be more
accountable in administrative roles. However, individual physician profit-motivation in a clinical,
individual context can often be excused, for the reasons stated above. On the other hand, once a
medical professional assumes an OM medical profit motive, they are not afforded the same
moral excuses and they are more accountable for upholding the values at stake in organizational
medical decision-making.
Another difference between a medical professional in this role and a non-medical
professional in this role is that the medical professional morally ought to be in the administrative
role. Doctors can assume the role and be morally justified while the non-experts cannot. Moral
ignorance cannot excuse the fact that the non-expert administrator ought not to be in that position
without adequate medical knowledge. In theory, to be a medical administrator without medical
expertise is like being a physician without a medical license. In the latter case, there is something
wrong with a physician who is not medically licensed; not only does it diminish (or abolish)
patient trust (if if is even established in the first place), it signifies that someone attempting to
assume the role of the medical professional is not qualified enough to earn a license to practice
medicine. Why do we not think about medical administration in a similar way? There should be
some component of medical expertise—similar to gaining a medical license—that ought to be
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required for a role that oversees multiple medical decision-making transactions and the larger
practice of medicine.
Given its prevalence in modern medical administration, and the moral significance
behind non-medical professionals overseeing patient care and medical organizations, there is
reason to think that serious revisions should be enacted in order to have hospitals and other large
medical organizations led by medical professionals. If it is the case that one with an OM medical
profit motive must be at the helm of a medical administration, it ought to be a medical expert.
This should not be a troubling idea. In fact, having a physician-leader of a hospital or a medical
organization improves quality-of-care and hospital rankings. 79,80
One challenge to this idea is that clinicians and other medical experts may feel inclined to
stay in individual, autonomous practice and just engage in the doctor-patient relationship. But
these experts must also recognize that improved, moral medical care is dependent on medical
expertise in administrative practices. It may be the case that a poorly developed physician
management infrastructure (a lack of administrative accountability for physicians and the
responsibility of solely patients) is the cause of resistance to expert led care, so in order to move
forward, this infrastructure must be modified. 81
In sum, it is far more immoral to maintain an OM profit motive when compared to
maintaining an IM medical profit motive because of administrators’ lack of medical expertise, in
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combination with their heightened agency, increased responsibility in the medical organization,
and the absence of moral excuses.
V.

Objections
I will now consider two relevant objections to my argument in this chapter. First, one

may argue that my discussion of the economic coercion and domination from medical
administrators towards those involved in patient care in the medical organization is unfair
because medical administrators—in for-profit health systems—face similar pressures from those
with even more agency in the medical organization (such as a shareholder or a trustee).
While I realize that medical administrators face similar pressures from stock-holders or
trustees in for-profit medical care, they are not afforded the same moral excuse because of
economic pressure. If stabber A is being forced by stabber A* to coerce B and C to act in
accordance with A*’s plan, and A*’s forcing of A is one of a purely economic nature, it doesn’t
provide the same moral excuse as B or C may be afforded if their health and livelihood are in
jeopardy. This is not to say that for-profit higher administration is not wrong, because an OM
profit motive at this level is still morally wrong. Rather, I don’t believe that the role obligations
of medical administrators (to maximize profit) can justify acting under economic (or other forms
of) pressure; medical administrators must be morally responsible through business practices by
acknowledging their influence on patient care and their ability to correct for moral wrongness in
medical operation, especially considering the level of agency a medical administrator holds in
the medical organization.
One may also object to my position by denying the plausibility of my argument when
applied into real-world medical administration. To claim that medical administrators ought to be
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medical experts and that an OM medical profit motive is morally risky is not the most “practical”
position, but being most practical and being most morally correct do not sometimes align. I
understand that administrators in healthcare organizations are valued because of their efficiency
and business knowledge (and medical organizations, in some ways, can benefit from that
mindset), but these assets should not conflict with an administrator’s ability to properly manage a
moral medical organization. Ethics should not be compromised for effectiveness. For example, if
it were the case that students with black hair were shown to perform significantly better
throughout college, it would not be the right decision to admit only students with black hair
because the moral decision would be to admit a diversity of students while considering factors
that—on balance—lead to success. Similarly, it is not necessarily the right decision to have the
most efficient medical administrators leading medical organizations. Business considerations
cannot justify the OM medical profit motive; as established in Chapter I, because these
considerations are conditionally valuable, and when compared to the unconditional value of
human health at risk, business and profit considerations are always less morally significant.
VI.

Implications

There are several implications that can be drawn from my argument. I will offer two
major recommendations that I believe to be the most important interpretations of the above
analysis on the medical profit motive in the medical organization. Before I begin, I want to stress
that for any of my argument to have application into real-world medical administration,
administrative policy must change, and as I have mentioned above, this responsibility falls on the
shoulders of the medical administration. Thus, any digestion and application of my position
requires (1) self-reflection on the behalf of current (or rising) medical administrators, and (2)
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effort on the behalf of medical practitioners to utilize these arguments towards pursing a more
morally sound medical administration.
As I have stated before, I believe that medical experts would make for more morally
sound medical administrators; they would be able to properly value human health in the context
of decision-making. Medical experts as administrators could apply this trait into administrative
decision-making and would be able to make more morally sound health-cost tradeoff analyses. In
some instances, these analyses may provide for economically favorable outcomes, but in other
instances, a moral decision could be made based on the value of health assessed to be potentially
lost from an administrative decision.
Though still operating within an inherently immoral practice, expert-administrators
would provide for the most morally sound-yet-practical outcome: administrative practices in the
medical organization guided by those with the ability to adequately value human health. This
recommendation is stronger when also taking into account that research has demonstrated a
significant increase in the quality of a medical organization when being led by a physician.
If current administrators—or those with an OM medical profit motive—are to remain in
place, and assuming that profit motivations remain intact despite moral analyses, I recommend
that hospital and physician profits be aligned with quality-of-care directly. This is a similar
model to “accountable care” and “Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)” that are being
implemented though the realization of the Affordable Care Act. ACOs are “collections of doctors
and hospitals that are paid to coordinate care, eliminate unnecessary tests and treatments, and
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keep people healthy and out of the hospital” through revised incentive and savings programs. 82
At its core, the ACO model is able to succeed because it is able to “incentivize hospitals,
physicians, post-acute care facilities, and other providers involved to form linkages and facilitate
coordination of care delivery.” 83 For example, within an ACO, a physician would be monetarily
incentivized to keep their patients out of the hospital or reduce the amount of days their patients
spend in the hospital. This is different than a fee-for-service model of medical reimbursement
that would incentivize physicians to maximize the amount of medical visits they carry out and
the amount of medical treatment they provide. Further, if a hospital is able to save money on
treatment plans while maintaining treatment effectiveness, they are able to share in a portion of
those savings with a government-sponsored health care program (like Medicare).
In theory, a shared savings/quality-of-care model of physician and hospital profit
derivation resolves—or at least mitigates—several of the moral issues mentioned above. On the
individual doctor-patient level, doctors are incentivized to provide the highest quality care
possible through monetary compensation (assuming that, all else not considered, they are like
The Greedy Neurosurgeon and only value money). On the administrative level, it is also morally
beneficial to align profit motivation and quality-of-care because medical administrators will
strive, based on their role obligations and collective motivations, to foster an environment where
patient health and well-being is on-balance being optimally promoted. If a hospital
administration were to adopt a shared savings/quality-of-care incentive model for medical
operations, they can enter into a similar state (morally) as The Greedy Neurosurgeon at the
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conclusion of Chapter I: pro tanto, health commodification through administrative practices is
still morally wrong, but while acknowledging that some practices must be place in order to
benefit patient health and well-being, the other remaining administrative policies and practices
ought to align profit motivation with quality-of-care. Indubitably, the promotion of patient health
and well-being is the intention behind the moral critique of the profit motive, so when keeping
that in mind, I support a solution that may include a portion of pro tanto wrongness but can
benefit patient care in the long run; thus, I assert that accountable care is the most morally
desirable model of medical profit derivation.
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Chapter III: Values-Centered Health Care
If I am right about the profit motive in medicine, what does that mean for health care
policy and health care reform?
In this chapter, I apply my thesis into the political and broader societal arena, looking at
morally-motivated medicine and how it can be applied throughout the overarching system of
health care in the United States. I have already examined clinical practice and administrative
practice through the medium of the profit motive, so to conclude this argument, I carry the
examination towards health care policy and discuss how policy may be shaped to help a moral
medical organization with reduced profit motivation to become a realistic benchmark.
Starting with a reflection on the previous chapters, I then introduce a theory values-based
health care. I then delineate several principles that I believe to be vital to moral health care
reform moving forward, principles that I further explore in the first three sections, respectively.
In Section IV, I address an objection to my position: a view on health care that is pro-market and
supports promoting quality-of-care through decreased economic regulation. In Section V, after
the explanation of a particular pro-market argument, I show how pro-market health care
discourse misses the moral facts at stake almost entirely. To be fair, I also discuss particular
aspects of a pro-market model for health care that approach areas of needed attention with reason
and legitimacy. In Section VI, I apply this debate into the sphere of health care policy. I address
areas of health care that are in particular need of moral examination either due to their inherently
morally risky nature or current immoral practices within the area. To conclude, I discuss the need
for reform within every tier of medicine.
Preface
75

For-profit medical organization began to emerge as a prominent model for organization
in the mid 1950’s when conversations began to surface about the ethical implications of the
hospital, or other for-profit medical setting, acting simultaneously as a business. 84 Dan Brock
and Allen Buchanan were among the first to discuss the medical profit motive in a negative
context in their work The Profit Motive in Medicine. 85 The authors introduce the sheer
complexity of the ethics surrounding health care and the medical organization, a sentiment that is
shared by all parties within the anti-profit v. for-profit debate. They frame their argument around
two central criticisms against for-profit medical care that were voiced at the time:
(1) For-profit medical organizations did not do enough for the poor or did not provide
enough charitable service to warrant themselves being enumerated as a “hospital” or medical
organization. 86
(2) A profit motive could be risky in a clinical context because of the inherent conflicts-ofinterest that could arise from “profit-seeking” practices. 87
I agree with the essential dismissal of the Brock and Buchanan’s first concern; in their
argument, they state that a large portion of patients in the medical organization receive care
without paying, which acts in accordance with the relevant laws on hospitals treating patients
regardless of paying. Further, the authors state that a for-profit health care organization dismisses
their general obligations to provide for patient health and well-being because, like an individual,
they pay taxes (that fund physician care) and support health care. However, Brock and
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Buchanan’s analysis of the second concern is circular and tenuous. They raise several valid
reasons why we should believe that for-profit medical care is damaging to clinical practice,
including the claim that the “consumer in health care…is in an especially vulnerable position,”
and the incentive of overutilization can introduce “serious and widespread health harms to
patients.” 88
Even still, Brock and Buchanan fail to take a definitive stance on the issue. While they
started the battle, they hardly won the war against the medical profit motive. My pursuit builds
on their work. What ideals or principles would be of the utmost importance for those with power
in medical decision-making to consider throughout their functioning in health care? Brock and
Buchanan left a great deal to be answered in their initial analysis, and although the foundation
for sustained criticism is there, they chose to signpost the moral risk involved in medical profit
motivation rather than take a definitive stance.
Considering and expanding on Brock and Buchanan’s argument, I support the following
principles:
Principle 1: The sovereignty of the medical professional should remain intact.
Principle 2: Those with administrative privilege or systemic decision-making capacity
should make efforts to reduce pecuniary conflicts-of-interest in medicine, when possible.
Principle 3: Quality-of-care should be our guiding factor; patient health outcomes are
what truly matter.
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These three principles prompt several medical reforms. Foremost, moral medical reform
should be values-centered. Thus, I take these three principles to be the guiding principles of
values-centered health care, a theory of how health care reform morally ought to be based on the
value of human health. In values-centered health care, health becomes a deontological constraint
on medical decision-making and policy formation; those with heightened agency in the medical
field must consider action through the lens of the unconditional value of health. Apart from
justice discussions in health care or market discussions in health care, values-centered health care
is concerned with disallowing profit considerations—or instrumental values—to govern effects
on the non-instrumental values at stake in patient care.
Values-centered health care exists in the realm of perfectionism when considering its
place in moral and political philosophy. Perfectionism means that one “advance[s] an objective
account of the good and then develop[s] an account of ethics and/or politics that is informed by
this account of the good.” 89 That is exactly what I am doing here; values-centered health care is
premised on the moral facts that ought to make up the skeleton of the moral medical organization
or a portion of moral health care policy. The theory of values-centered health supports ethical
conclusions that should influence medical practitioners or current medical policies.
The following three sections will engage with values-centered health care in distinct ways,
with each engagement leading to important conclusions about moral patient care and the pursuit
of the moral medical organization.
I. The Sovereignty of the Medical Expert
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The first principle is derived from Brock and Buchanan’s attention to the patient-doctor
relationship and the degree to which patient trust generated strong obligations in medical. My
first principle to guide health care and medical reform is:
Principle 1: The sovereignty of the medical professional must remain intact.
Without the sovereignty of the medical professional being intact, a medical organization is
subject to unnecessary moral risk. As I have discussed, the medical professional is in a unique
position to recognize the values at stake in medical decision-making, especially in the clinical
setting. As soon as an act of reformation attempts to remove some portion of physician
sovereignty to account for increased costs or increased regulation, that act is removing what
makes moral medical care possible.
I am not, however, advocating for a complete removal of administrative privilege over
the medical professional. To allow for physician sovereignty is partly a function of what already
occurs in a standard medical organization; the “typical” hospital is comprised of “a nonprofit
corporation with a board of trustees as the ultimate authority…although the trustees delegate
operating responsibility to the hospital’s administration, there is also a second separate line of
authority emanating from the medical staff, which constitutes the hospital’s affiliated
physicians.” 90 The classical medical organization intends to separate clinical care from
administrative work, something that is a necessary condition for physician sovereignty to begin
its establishment in the medical organization. If this were not the case, an administrator could
veto medical decisions (i.e. all prescriptions, procedures, and clinical treatment plans could be
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passed through to an objective medical administrator who only gives approval to means of
treatment that are monetarily desirable); there would be something fundamentally wrong with
that. It may seem redundant to mention that this aspect of physician sovereignty must be in place,
but keep in mind that these principles of values-based health care are not only retroactively
analyzing health care, they are in place for future reform to base action off of. In some future
policy decision, the line between administrative sectors and patient care sectors could blur, and
this principle would tell against such a decision.
Unfortunately, the line is blurring as health care organizations sift through reform and
increased mindedness towards pecuniary matters. There is only partial truth within the classical
organization of the hospital because direct clinical effect should not be the only measure of
practitioner sovereignty. As previously discussed, administrative decisions can also have
significant effects on patient care, an idea that extends to medical policy. A policy decision can
be viewed as restricting physician sovereignty, although to a lesser degree; I would be more
willing to claim that policy decisions end up affecting medical administration (which, in turn,
ends up affecting medical practitioners, but the connection is less direct). Due to this reality,
attention towards maintaining physician sovereignty must increase in health care. This idea tells
in favor of a previous argument for medical professionals to assume administrative roles in the
medical organization; if this were possible, physician sovereignty would inherently be promoted
because physicians would assume the roles that might otherwise be suppressing medical
decision-making. With or without a physician in an administrative role, medical expertise is an
indispensably valuable item in the medical organization. The same is true in medical policy
decision-making; health care policy must not overlook or stampede upon the moral uniqueness
of the medical professional.
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This principle will not be effective if physicians are not responsible; an indispensable
characteristic of the moral physician is responsibility (which includes awareness of the complex
organization that they operate within, accountability for wrongdoing, and the respective
sovereignty of the patient population in medical decision-making). Assuming the moral
physician is able to operate within a medical organization, efforts should be made to increase
physician sovereignty, even if that does not translate to overhauling current administrative bodies
for replacement. This should especially be a guiding principle when framing health care reform
around erroneous characteristics of clinical care through modern health care organizations.
In policy decisions, this principle can materialize in a number of ways. In essence, I
believe that the same arguments for medical expertise in administration should hold true for
medical policy makers:
P1: Hospital administration should require a certain degree of medical expertise.
P2: There is no morally relevant difference between hospital administrators and certain
public policy administrators.
C: Some policy administrators should require medical expertise.
When making decisions that will significantly impact systemic medical decision-making,
fundamentally understanding the value of human health is a necessary consideration for a policy
maker. From this argument, there are several revisions to current health care policy formation
that should be made. It may be ludicrous to claim that all health care policy makers should have
a medical degree or be medically trained, but those are the moral facts within values-centered
health care. This does not mean that this should be carried out towards full realization, but it does
tell in favor of moving the structure of policy making towards valuing medical expertise. This
can be achieved by having independent agencies comprised of medical professionals aiding in
policy formation, having medical policy be filtered through a similar agency before being passed
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into law, or even having the AMA (American Medical Association) appoint medical
professionals to particular roles that are responsible—in portion—for the creation and fostering
of health care policy.
II. Reducing Conflicts-of-Interest
The second principle (distilled from my medical profit motive discussion) is related to the
profit motivation itself:
Principle 2: Those with administrative privilege or systemic decision-making capacity
should make efforts to reduce pecuniary conflicts-of-interest in medicine, when possible.
This principle applies to all agents in the medical organization; as I have demonstrated, an
amalgamation of responsibilities in the medical organization is undesirable. With increased
external pressures—from society, from government regulation, and from other factors—on the
modern health care organization can lead to an increased willingness to implement regulatory
practices, some which may be detrimental to patient care or the patient-doctor relationship. This
principle is—in some ways—analogous to a principle that permeates clinical research ethics; in
clinical research ethics, conflicts-of-interest are undesirable, especially those of a financial nature.
Conflicts of interest in clinical research “point to a tension between relying on profits to motivate
business versus insulating drug development and testing from the profit motive as a way of
protecting research subjects and future patients.” 91 Because of this, profit-motivated conflicts of
interest “may not be amenable to the commonly pursued remedy of addressing ethical concerns
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in clinical research by promulgating a few new guidelines.” 92 I believe the same concern arises
in standard patient care, and a similar motivating principle should be applied in order to protect
not only patient populations, but the medical doctor in the medical organization.
Of course, patient populations are the primary reason that this motivating principle is in
place. Research ethics acknowledges the moral risk involved with participation in clinical
research, and the same can be done in cases of profit-derived medical actions. While this quote is
not exactly similar to what has been discussed in profit-motivated patient care, consider the
following quote from David Wendler’s The Ethics of Clinical Research:
“The process of conducting clinical research involves the threat of exploitation of a
particular kind. It runs the risk of investigators treating persons as things, devoid of any
interests of their own. The worry here is not so much that investigators and subjects enter
together into the shared activity of clinical research with different, perhaps even
conflicting goals. The concern is rather that, in the process of conducting clinical research,
investigators treat subjects as if they had no goals at all or, perhaps, that any goals they
might have are normatively irrelevant.” 93
We can begin to see increased similarities between what is morally at stake in research ethics and
what is morally at stake in patient care; the “threat of exploitation” is of the same particular kind:
unconditional value commodification. The difference between commodification in these two
areas of clinical activity relates to the shared or distinct “goals” relating to patient involvement.
In clinical research ethics, it is easier to see how shared goals may be reached; profit-motivated
clinicians seek treatment that works (and, will hence, deliver a profit). In profit-motivated
standard patient care, shared goals seem more nebulous of a concept; I have explored the
inherent tension between cost cutting and profit derivation versus quality-of-care in my previous
arguments, and it will be more difficult to remedy that divide. Moreover, this disparity in patient
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care can lead to moral travesties on a systemic level. This is not to suggest that it is not possible
for clinical ethics to cause great wrongdoing (i.e. if a risky treatment plan is heavily pursued and
ends up harming a large volume of patients), but wrongdoing is more easily accounted for and
justified in the context of clinical research ethics. The field is premised on some deal of risk and
consent to risk.
This principle is in place to also protect the medical professional from making morally
risky decisions. Physicians may feel inclined to cut costs or seek more expensive treatment plans
in medical care in order to make more money, something that also can prove to be detrimental in
the clinical setting. Both of these situations are unattractive for a moral medical organization. It
may not be the most ideal solution, but to inject practicality into what has been discussed in my
engagement with ideal theory, a way to pursue a more moral medical organization is to reduce
economic conflicts-of-interest. This can be done a number of ways; I have mentioned
accountable care (or quality-of-care/shared savings profit derivation) as a potential model to
reduce economic conflicts-of-interest, but this is not the only solution.
On a general level, if we were to borrow “advice” from principles in place within clinical
research ethics, it has been suggested that moral clinical research can be pursued if patients and
clinicians share similar goals. Accountable care is one approach to addressing this general
principle, but there can be other ways that clinical goals can join together. It would be hard to
imagine that patients could share a goal of profit motivation in the clinical setting, so I support
the notion that patients have the goal of increasing their health or well-being when willingly
engaging with a medical professional. Even if one wanted to claim that physicians and patients
could share the goal of wanting to make or save the most money in a treatment plan, these are
still incongruent goals. Patients would want to save money because of their financial health,
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while physicians (who wanted to save money) would want to save money because of the health
of their institution; physicians do not make more money if they save money for their medical
organization—unless, of course, their medical organization happens to be an Accountable Care
Organization.
The Accountable Care Organization seems to be the most logical way to account for the
immoral nature of profit motivation, something that policy makers have been—and should
continue to be—mindful of. In the ACA, the Accountable Care Organization was introduced as a
prevalent model of health care maintenance for Medicare patients; large medical organizations
are incentivized to uptake this model of health care because of the “shared savings” potential
they can take in (that is, a share of the savings they obtain through caring for their Medicare
patients without sacrificing current standards of patient care). If the ACO model of health care
proves to be successful with lowering costs and improving patient health, it should be
implemented into further areas of health care. Even if the ACO model is not successful, policy
makers must be mindful of the inherent tension between profit and health promotion that exists
in a fee-for-service model of health care.
To reduce economic conflicts-of-interest in health care is not only desirable because of
the promotion of the value of human health, but because economic conflicts-of-interest may
contribute to a degradation of the trust within the doctor-patient relationship. Take the following
case as an example:
The Conflicted Oncologist. Dr. L is conflicted between satisfying two interest groups in
medical decision-making. On one hand, Dr. L wants to prescribe his patients the most
effective (cost-effective and for health) pharmaceutical to treat their cancer. On the other
hand, Dr. L is receiving money from a large pharmaceutical company to prescribe a
different, less effective pharmaceutical.
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This is morally troubling, especially if Dr. L’s patients were aware of this conflict. In one regard,
this economic conflict-of-interest could directly impact patient health, but indirectly, there are
additional ways that patient health could be affected. Consider, now, that a patient was aware of
Dr. L being funded by a large pharmaceutical company. If this were the case, there is a chance
that the patient would lose trust in Dr. L, which could then directly affect the treatment of that
patient; it is difficult for patient well-being to be optimally promoted without patient trust being
intact because compliance with advised treatment and obtaining relevant information to make
informed medical decisions requires patient trust. In both of these ways, pecuniary conflicts-ofinterest are undesirable. Unfortunately, Dr. L is not an anomaly in the medical field, as
evidenced by a database compiled by ProPublica that displays the amount of “industry” dollars
being funneled to physicians for “promotional talks, research, and consulting.” 94
III. Goal-Mindedness Towards Patient Outcomes
The third principle—perhaps the most important for health care reform to be mindful
of—is based on the “commodity” at stake in health care: human health and well-being. With all
of the conversation on health care reform relating to economic feasibility and political tension, I
feel as though the moral purpose of medical reform is sometimes lost in the fray. Thus, I have
generated my third principle for health care reform to be mindful of:
Principle 3: Quality-of-care must be our guiding factor; patient health outcomes are what
truly matter.
If a more moral medical organization comes about, it is ultimately because they are able to
promote patient health and well-being to the optimal level. This principle grounds valuescentered health care; the value of patient health and well-being ought to be what invokes
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conversation in the forum of health policy, and if a policy detriments this value, policy-makers or
relevant individuals in that sphere ought to consider revision towards a more moral policy. This
principle was derived from my arguments in Chapters I and II, where I have exemplified the
sheer importance of patient health outcomes and championed them in the clinical/administrative
spheres of the medical organization. With this principle, I intend to do the same at the policy
level.
At the policy level, there are a number of ways that quality-of-care can be the “guiding
factor” in how policy is developed and how policy is evaluated. To name a few, quality-of-care
measures can be instituted that provide feedback on how policy decisions are affecting qualityof-care. To reduce the impersonal nature of this data, the feedback should include some form of
direct patient response or patient testimony. That way, quality-of-care can avoid being
commodified as much as possible. Another way for quality-of-care to remain at the forefront of
consideration in policy formation is for policy makers to develop some “code of conduct” or
statement of ethics that they must swear to upon entering their role as a policy maker, something
that would be analogous to the Hippocratic Oath (but would be relevant for policy making). As a
general rule, if policy can be directed away from making health care into more of a market place
(to avoid health commodification) and closer to respecting the value of patient health and a
proper quality-of-care, that would be morally desirable.
Quality-of-care is not intended to simply mean the quality of individual patient visits; I
am referring to a systemic quality-of-care. In these terms, we can start to think about quality-ofcare in a faux-consequentialist mindset. We would not be able to articulate this principle in pure
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consequentialist terms because it would diminish what is important about moral medical care. 95
Let us say that a health care reform is looking to implement one of two policies to aid some
aspect of patient care, A and B. Through pure consequentialism, we would desire to produce the
maximum amount of utils (of patient happiness or even health outcomes) with a given decision,
regardless of how it may be structured. If policy A produces 120 utils as opposed to the 100 utils
produced by policy B, policy A is preferred in this mindset. Now, let us assume that these
policies affect 10 individuals, and while policy B produces 10 utils of health outcomes per
individual, policy A produces 80 utils of health outcomes for one person (and the rest are divided
evenly among the remaining 9 patients). This would be an unjust way to frame optimal health
care reform; we must consider that maximizing health outcomes—in a purely consequentialist
set—is not our mission. I support a baseline of health outcomes for as many individuals as
possible, and after that condition is met, I can understand being concerned with health outcomes.
If a reform practice is detrimental to health outcomes, it need not be pursued. 96
The patient, similar to the medical professional in Principle 2, must also be a responsible
agent in medical decision-making; a moral medical organization cannot be a practical benchmark
if the effort towards moral medical decision-making is one-sided. It is harder to generalize or
characterize patient responsibility in health care because of the inherent complexity and
subjectivity of the patient experience. Still, patient responsibility must include self-reflection
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about health care utilization and effort towards maintaining quality care (so efforts to remain
steadfast in appropriate treatment plans). Patients must be active participants in their treatment
plans for moral medical reform to be effective. A medical policy may have the proper intentions
and may increase quality-of-care with compliance from patient populations, but it cannot be
criticized if the policy fails because of patient noncompliance.
Here, I am not saying that patient must abide by medical policies or succumb to treatment
plans if they are prescribed by their physicians; I am just trying to relieve some portion of blame
from medical professionals and medical policy makers if they are acting ethically. In some cases,
patients might reject a treatment plan for other motivations (to save money, they do not value
their health, they want to die, etc.). I will not criticize their decision here because I am concerned
by those with heightened agency in medical decision-making taking advantage of weak agents to
pursue something undesirable in medical care. For example, if an elder woman who is afflicted
with terminal cancer decides to discontinue further cancer treatment in order to save money for
her relatives, this is permissible. I think that this woman is mistaken about the value of her own
life by commodifying her health, but (assuming it was free from coercion) it is a decision that
she has made on her own volition—a decision that she is entitled to make. This is not the same
case as a commodification process that is forwarded by a health professional and takes advantage
of a weak agent.
Keep in mind, patient responsibility in medical and health care ethics is minimal for a
reason: the particular vulnerability of the patient in medical decision-making and the fear
towards medical paternalism suggest emphasizing professional responsibility over patient
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responsibility. 97 Without at least some component of patient responsibility in health care reform,
however, it would not be fair to attribute all of the moral blame towards a medical organization
striving for more morally sound operation.
IV. “Wal-Mart” or “Southwest” Healthcare
Values-centered medical reform is antithetical to ideas about promoting free-markets in
health care. I support reducing market-mindedness in health care through value attribution and
promotion towards human health, but others have approached this same issue—and have reached
the same conclusion—through different (sometimes related) discussions. Others, still, have not
reached the same conclusion.
Market thinking in health care within the United States is “easy to see…the emergence of
the market frame among elites is having crucial influence on the evolution of contemporary
American health policy;” while it is tempting to pursue for pecuniary purposes, it is
simultaneously “luring health policy voyagers to destruction on the shoals of clashing values.” 98
This quote is from Mark Schlesinger’s argument in On Values and Democratic Policy Making:
The Deceptively Fragile Consensus around Market-Oriented Medical Care, where Schlesinger
approaches the market debate in medicine from a political standpoint. Even here, Schlesinger
concedes that pro-market health care reformation introduces morally troubling conflicts-ofinterest. His central claim is that a “divergent [notion] of fairness” is what has led market-based
health care reform to implement questionable or objectionable health care policy. Schlesinger’s
argument is empirical and demonstrates (in conjunction with the apropos title) that market97
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directed medical reform is not supported as strongly by political and authoritative elites as one
would imagine, based on the market-directed medical reforms that have been implemented over
the recent history of American medicine. In his concluding remarks, he takes a weaker position
on the issue by suggesting this:
“Proponents of managed competition and market-oriented medical care therefore need to
develop strategies that can both acknowledge the risks of greater disparities and mitigate
those risks in a meaningful manner. To date, policy makers have largely ignored these
obligations. In my assessment, this reflects the connection that they draw between market
reforms and norms of equity, connections that are not shared by all the elites who favor
markets, and which are rejected by most of the public.” 99

His analysis raises the question: why are market-directed efforts towards health care reform so
vehemently rejected by the public? Keeping this in mind, we will now examine a particular promarket argument.
John H. Cochrane introduced a fervent, sometimes abrasive argument towards a freemarket model of medicine in his work After the ACA: Freeing the market for health care; he
believes that a “much less regulated” health care system is “possible, and necessary,” and in
general, he argues for a market-based health care model. 100 Cochrane is a professor of finance at
the University of Chicago, someone very qualified to be discussing market principles and ways
to implement strategies that result in more effective marketplaces. Unfortunately, Cochrane is
missing the point of the medical “marketplace”: the idea in itself is immoral, and he—along with
myself or any other non-medical professional—is the last person apt enough to be making
values-based decisions about patient health and well-being. The moral decision is to turn away
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from health commodification, something that Cochrane embraces in his analysis. Apart from the
inherently immoral nature of a market-based argument for health care, there are other reasons to
believe that Cochrane is mistaken about the moral facts behind patient care (which will be
depicted in the next section). 101
Cochrane initiates his analysis in a beneficial manner, but quickly turns his analysis awry;
he states, “we all agree what we’d like to see: Health care needs to become efficient, innovative,
and provide high quality of care at a reasonable cost,” an idea that anybody could support. Those
factors of ideal medical care are linked to what drives individuals to debate medical ethics in the
first place: we care about providing the best medical care possible because there is something
special—yet ethically fragile—in the scheme of medical decision-making. I will not attempt to
show that Cochrane’s intentions are misguided because I believe that is adverse to his pursuit in
the first place; I will instead demonstrate how Cochrane’s approach, evidence, and conclusions
are all ethically misguided. Even ethically misguided analyses are important because they help us
affirm the moral facts that are essential to promote or uphold.
His paper is structured around fundamental economic principles, so he begins by
discussing the “supply” side of health care. Here, Cochrane is angered by the lack of process
efficiency in health care, something that he suggests could be remedied by looking at other
“complex service-oriented industries” and applying their efficiency principles. After all, “the
Cheesecake Factory delivers a complex service-oriented product with remarkable quality,
efficiency, and cost…why can’t hospitals do the same?” The problem here is that the complex
101

A good portion of Cochrane’s argument is about the way our health insurance is structured in the
United States and how that affects the medical marketplace. As much as I am able to (because really, they
are intertwined), I attempt to stray away from this argument; I do not discuss the ethics of health
insurance in this paper. Thus, I will fail to mention a significant portion of what Cochrane is angered
about by our current health care system.
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service-oriented industry that Cochrane is comparing medicine to is not even close to being as
valuable or subjective as medical care is. The author continues his attempt to liken health care to
other industries because of their ability to optimize quality and service, next by positing to the
reader that “the iPhone error rate is a lot lower than the medical error rate.” 102 It is one thing to
make claims about how the medical field can benefit from economic industry principles, but I
have an issue with when these suggestions are intentionally misleading. Of course the medical
error rate is higher than the iPhone error rate; the premise of medicine is fixing error in human
well-being. The premise of an iPhone sale is to provide an excellent product, and if that was
associated with a high error rate, the business of the iPhone would diminish. Medical care is
premised on fixing medical ailments, and often, procedures or acute care treatment plans are
complex in nature. Thus, one must expect medical error to be relatively higher—it exists in a
completely different context. I am not saying that high medical error is acceptable; I am saying
that making a claim that likens medical error to technological error is not only cold and
dehumanizing, but incorrectly assessing the moral realities behind the two kinds of error.
Cochrane continues his analysis by focusing on competition in the medical “marketplace”.
He introduces some valid points about not enough competition existing between medical
insurance companies, but when he extends this debate into the medical organization, it is
erroneous. At times, he focuses on the consolidation of the medical organization, something that
is inevitable with future health care reform. This is not where I raise an issue with Cochrane’s
point; the reality is such, and we must be even more mindful of how we separate clinical care
with administrative practice. Instead, Cochrane incorrectly criticizes the “fragmentation” of the
medical organization. He fails to take notice of the specialty and specificity of each medical
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branch, and while I agree that some areas in medicine could be theoretically consolidated (to
“streamline” medical care in a pursuit of efficiency without jeopardizing patient well-being),
fragmentation is in place because of medical specificity; to consolidate all medical branches
under one umbrella through a profit motive could be detrimental to patient care.
When discussing health care policy on a broader scale, Cochrane does not feel too
optimistic, suggesting that “government-imposed efficiency” of markets are, “to put it charitably,
a hope without historical precedent.” 103 Primarily, let us not forget that health care should not
simply be a marketplace (based on the unconditional value of human health), and even if we
think about health care as a standard marketplace, historical precedent of effectiveness is not the
way we should be framing moral medical reform. Medicine needs some form of regulation
because of what is at stake in medical decision-making. Moral medical reform should be
forward-thinking and should examine the aforementioned “picnic spot”; even if it cannot be fully
realized, the moral medical organization can be pursued, and this is apart from historical
precedent.
Cochrane then examines the “demand” side of the health care market, which further
distorts the application of Cochrane’s analysis (because health care is a desirable commodity,
correct? Ironically, if demand for health care was at an all-time low, that would be an optimal
scenario, something that Cochrane’s analysis could not account for). 104 In this examination,
Cochrane raises an interesting and controversial scenario that he recommends as being useful to
think about when examining the economics of medical care. His case is as follows:
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its best” and thriving with tremendous patient volumes in a sickly society. Clearly, our moral intuitions do
not say the same. In a moral model of the health care market, no individual would require medical
attention. This is the root of why market-mindedness and health care are ethically counter-intuitive.
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“So what does “need” really mean for services like these? The only sensible economic
definition I can think of is that “need” is the bundle of services you would choose if you
were paying with your own money at the margin. You “need” that MRI to make sure
your back pain won’t just heal after 6 weeks of ibuprofen if you’d be willing to shell out
$1,000 of your own money to get it. (I am!) And you “need” it delivered at a convenient
hour, tomorrow, rather than next week across town if you’re willing to pay that extra
cost…As economists, we are expected to avoid that confusion. A good way to do so is to
pose the question in the positive rather than the negative: Suppose we offered each
patient the choice, ‘Your doctor prescribed this MRI. You can have the MRI or you can
have $1000 in cash.’ The patient “needs” the MRI if he or she foregoes the cash and goes
through with the MRI.” 105
Cochrane’s thought experiment seems to be—in his frame of reference—proposing an unsettling
reality of what medical “need” truly is, and I have an issue with the structure of this thought
experiment in the first place. His thought experiment qualifies as value-centered coercion, a
theory I forward in Chapter II. An action—according to values-centered coercion—is coercive
when it forces an agent to choose between something of conditional value and something of
unconditional value. Whoever “we” is in this thought experiment, the “we” offers the patient the
choice between a treatment that can have potential health benefit or money, something of
conditional value. If the MRI is not clinically indicated or necessary, I will withdraw my critique,
but if it is, it assumes an unconditional value—it may be necessary to preserve the health and
well-being of the patient. Therefore, it would be coercive for this option to be given to the patient.
So, I would not think that a valid conclusion could be drawn from a thought experiment
premised on coercing an agent.
The essence of the disparity between Cochrane’s pro-market position and my position is
realized when Cochrane asserts that “health care is an economic good…health care is not that
different from the services provided by lawyers, auto mechanics, home remodelers, tax
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accountants, financial planners, restaurants, airlines or college professors.” 106 With the potential
exception of lawyers, I entirely disagree with Cochrane. This disagreement is at the core of
values-centered health care.
V. A Values-Centered Response to the Pro-Market Position
Cochrane’s argument is mistaken about the moral facts of medical care. To begin, he is
so adamant about the idea of the “for-profit” health organization being distinct from the
“nonprofit” medical organization, and it is not when considering the ethical wrongdoings relating
to patient care. As he acknowledges, for-profit medical organizations must answer to
stockholders and pay attention to their position as a publically-traded entity, but just because a
medical organization does not have stockholders does not mean that they do not maintain a profit
motivation; a board of trustees or governing body can just as easily desire profit and jeopardize
patient and well-being. There is still something fundamentally wrong with a medical profit
motivation regardless of the medical organization maintaining it, so health care policy in this
area should be directed towards all medical organizations. I would say that the profit-motive is
more dangerous and alarming in the for-profit setting, but still, effort should be directed towards
all medical profit motivation, regardless of its brand.
In After the ACA, Cochrane tries to justify medical reform on a value-neutral account,
something that I believe is unavoidable in the medical setting. It would seem that Cochrane
avoids a value-based account through a system of economic analysis, but I would disagree. By
arguing for increased competition, less regulation, and the promotion of economic or industrial
ideals in the medical market, Cochrane is making a claim about the value of freedom and
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economic sovereignty. If he was not or did not support this position, why should we have to
value his argument? His discussion is premised on the idea that freedom is intrinsically valuable.
I agree that freedom is valuable, but we must consider what other values are at stake in the
“medical market”. Primarily, I am referring to the value of human health; Cochrane avoids
making a claim on the value of health by analyzing health care as a system of commodities that
is subjected to supply and demand curves. This is a mistake, and even with the value of freedom
in mind, there are reasons to believe that the value of health can demand promotion over the
value of freedom (when the two are pitted against one another). 107
Cochrane—like others—needs to take a stance on the value of health, because I believe
this is the only method of pursing viable, patient-focused health care reform; the “others” I am
referring to includes policy makers in health care. Being value-neutral about human health is to
deny our humanity. There is no sense in rejecting the fact that human health is too subjective of a
value to allow for an unrestricted medial market place to viably emerge (and be morally in place),
and there is moral danger in treating health like any other commodity. Promoting values-centered
health care is where relevant medical policy needs to be directed towards.
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This is not an entirely controversial ideal; in other ways, we are able to sacrifice freedom to promote
other higher-order values. For example, we can think of having law enforcement agencies as being an
example of some member of society forfeiting some degree of autonomy to protect the autonomy and
bodily integrity of all of society. Additionally, we can think about providing tax dollars to provide public
goods as forfeiting some of our financial autonomy for the ability to educate our society, protect our
citizens, and promote other public goods. We can also think about forfeiting some of our financial
freedom in terms of Social Security: throughout our lives, we pay into a system that forces us to concede
some monetary freedom in order to help promote financial freedom in the future. There are several ways
that we forfeit freedom to promote unconditional values, an idea that sounds more controversial than it
actually is.
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Conclusion
I decided to pursue this project after I was able to reflect upon my personal experiences
with patient care and hospital administration. I plan on pursuing a career in medicine; as a result,
I have attempted to gain as much perspective into medical decision-making as possible. This
journey eventually led me into an internship under an administrator in a large medical
organization. From this experience, I was angered. I was angered by the commodification of
patient health I was witnessing. Patient health and well-being were the values that have
motivated me to pursue a career in medicine, and to see those be degraded by administrative
decision-making was frustrating. I have been fortunate enough to learn about and appreciate the
uniqueness, subjectivity, and importance of human health, realized though discourse with
medical professionals and patients with medical ailments. Even though my experiences with
medical administration have been frustrating, I am also thankful for having them. Otherwise, I
would not have been intrigued by the tension between business considerations and medicine, and
thus, I would not have pursued this defense against profit-motivated health commodification in
health care.
In this thesis, I have championed the unconditional value of human health in all tiers of
health care. I have shown that there are reasons to believe that doctors have concrete obligations
to their patients, and these obligations amount to a physician being accountable for not optimally
promoting patient health and well-being. Early on, I introduced “the medical profit motive” as
the direct antithesis to doctoral obligation. Within the medical profit motive, an agent would in
some way desire monetary profit that would result from patient care. To think about medical
profit in this way is a complete rejection of our humanity and the nature of patient care. Although
profit motivation can be justified when isolated into a doctor-patient relationship, the same does
98

not hold true for an administrative medical profit motive. When thinking about leadership and
responsibility in collective wrongdoing, the non-existence of normatively significant force
(coercion) towards decision-making, and the lack of medical expertise that ought to exist in a
role responsible for medical decision-making, it is hard to transpose the justification of a medical
profit motive into the administrative sphere. I maintain that an administrative profit motive ought
to be abolished because of the moral risk involved, and if it cannot be abolished, it must be
accounted for.
This discussion began a larger conversation about values in health care policy. I was
particularly dissatisfied with a pro-market argument for health care reform, and I did not believe
that thought on distributive justice in health care truly captured what was morally at stake in
health care. Thus, I forwarded my own theory of health care: values-centered health care.
Values-centered health care borrowed the moral facts teased out from the first two chapters and
distilled them into three relevant principles for medical policy makers to consider. I believe that
health care reform guided by the value of health is the most desirable model of reform, and the
value of health cannot be lost though extensive policy debate.
With this, I charge the entire health care field to consider what has been introduced here
and in several other places: there is something unique about human health that should invoke
pause and caution when making decisions affecting health. For doctors, profit considerations are
still not desirable (they are pro tanto wrong), but if they are instrumental to providing optimal
patient outcomes, they can exist. Doctors should reflect on the value of patient health when
deciding how to best treat patients, and similarly, administrators should reflect on the value of
human health when deciding how to run medical organizations. If it is not fully possible, it still
should be understood that a medical organization led by medical experts is the most morally
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desirable model of administration. The medical administrator must use the value of patient health
as a bulwark against profit considerations that may be tied to their role in the medical
organization. The medical organization will have a very difficult time approaching a moral ideal
with a fee-for-service incentive structure in place; I have recommended the Accountable Care
model of patient care here, but regardless, there should be a push to reduce pecuniary conflictsof-interest in medical decision-making.
Those who develop medical policy ought to act through what has been introduced by
values-centered health care. In our current state of affairs, health care reform is at the forefront of
debate and consideration, so it is a very apt time for a theory of health care to be forwarded. It is
also a very apt time for the value of health to be lost in the maelstrom of policy and debate,
something that must not take place. When considering my future in the maelstrom of health care,
I must also be cautious of profit motivation in patient care. If I do become a medical doctor, I
cannot allow for a profit motivation to be at the forefront of my clinical practice. Like other
aspiring physicians, aspiring medical administrators, and those aspiring for roles that deal with
medical policy, we must recognize that the unconditional value of health is what governs moral
medical care.
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